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ABSTRACT
Electronic timekeeping is a ubiquitous feature of the modern
workplace. Time and attendance software enables employers to
record employees' hours worked, breaks taken, and related data
to determine compensation. Sometimes this software also
undermines wage and hour law, allowing bad actor employers
more readily to manipulate employee time cards, set up
automatic default rules that shave hours from employees'
paychecks, and disguise edits to records of wages and
hours. Software could enable transparency, but when it serves to
obfuscate instead, it misses an opportunity to reduce costly legal
risk for employers and protect employee rights. This article
examines thirteen commonly used timekeeping programs to
expose the ways in which software innovation can erode
compliance. Drawing on insights from the field of behavioral
compliance, we explain how the software presents subtle
situational cues that can encourage and legitimize wage theft. We
also examine gaps in the Fair Labor Standards Act's
recordkeeping rules - unchanged since the 1980s - that have
created a regulatory vacuum in which timekeeping software has
developed. Finally, we propose a series of reforms to those
recordkeeping requirements that would better regulate
timekeeping data and software systems and encourage wage and
hour law compliance across workplaces.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic timekeeping is a ubiquitous feature of the modern
workplace.' In place of the old punch-card time clock, employees
now log onto a computer or mobile device, swipe a radio
frequency identification (RFID) badge, scan a fingerprint, or
gaze into an iris recognition device.2 These and similar systems
1 2015 Getting Paid in America Survey, AMERICAN PAYROLL ASSOCIATION,
http://www.nationalpayrollweek.com/documents/NPW2015SurveyResults.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VNS7-M8KE] (of surveyed employees required to report their
hours, 52% did so through a PC, 22% via a badge/card reader, 4% using a
PDA, tablet or smartphone, and 9% using biometric scan).
2 See, e.g., Over 50,000 Companies Trust Easy Clocking's Time and Attendance
Systems, EASY CLOCKING, http://easyclocking.com/ [https://perma.cc/VK5M-
MHJN ](last visited Sept. 2, 2016) ("Choose from our wide array of
fingerprint, smart card, pin entry, PC or mobile employee time clocks"); Iris
2
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enable employers easily to record employees' hours worked,
breaks taken, and other information used to determine
compensation. Yet they can also enable employers to deprive
employees of earned pay by editing down their hours worked,
setting up automatic default rules that shave time, and
disguising edits to employees' time records. These actions
potentially violate the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
and its state and local counterparts.3 Some software thus creates
the means and opportunity for wage theft; without the proper
oversight, supervisors driven to minimize labor expenditures in
tight budgetary environments supply the cost-cutting motive.4
In doing so, supervisors work at cross purposes with the long-
term interests of their employer,5 which is then exposed to the
risk of expensive wage and hour litigation. This risk grows the
longer the wage theft goes undetected and the more widespread
those practices become. Like the recent Wells Fargo scandal,
where the company faced enormous fines and bad publicity after
a tiny fraction of its employees opened unauthorized accounts
for customers,6 wage theft by a small number of supervisors has
Recognition Employee Time Clock, EASY CLOCKING
http://easyclocking.com/iris-recognition-employee-time-clock.html
[https://perma.cc/6ZSA-KDWW] (last visited Sept. 2, 2016) (describing login
based on "iris recognition"); Using Biometrics in the Workplace, FISHER
PHILLIPS, http://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-newsletters-article-using-
biometrics-in-the-workplace [https://perma.cc/3526-9MA4] (last visited Sept.
2, 2016) (describing hand scanners as a form of biometric time clock);
Biometric Access Control, HUMANITY, http://www.humanity.com/biometric-
access-control/ [https://perma.cc/SA9F-77FQ] (last visited Sept. 2, 2016)
(describing "a feature called FacePunch which uses advanced facial
recognition technology").
3 See Part II infra, discussing the Fair Labor Standards Act and other wage
and hour laws.
4 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, A Part-Time Life, As Hours Shrink and Shift,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2012) (discussing pressure on supervisors to manage
overtime costs by changing workers' schedules); Steven Greenhouse, A Push
to Give Steadier Shifts to Part-Timers, N.Y. TIMES, (July 15, 2014) (same);
HARRIET PRESSER, WORKING IN A 24/7 ECONOMY (2005) (same).
5 As Elizabeth Umphress, Joanna Tochman Campbell, and John Bingham
explain, an employee may act with the intention of benefitting his/her
employer (for example, by shredding incriminating documents), even though
those actions are inconsistent with the employer's ultimate interests. Paved
with Good Intentions: Unethical Behavior Conducted to Benefit the
Organization, Coworkers, and Customers in MANAGERIAL ETHICS 127
(Marshall Schminke ed., 2010).
6 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of




(September 8, 2016). Wells Fargo fired approximately 5,300 employees in
connection with the fraud, which represented less than 2% of its 268,000
3
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the potential to balloon into substantial liability and extensive
litigation. An employer caught with questionable records is
poorly positioned to defend wage and hour litigation because a
court may declare those records "inaccurate" under a 1946
Supreme Court case, Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co.7
Under Mt. Clemens, the court may permit employees to
introduce testimonial evidence of their hours worked or rely on
representative evidence from a subset of plaintiffs.8 An
"inaccurate" determination also makes courts more likely to
impose liquidated damages.9 We posit that the litigation risk
employees. Wells Fargo Today - Quarterly Fact Sheet (2d Quarter 2016),
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/corporate/wells-fargo-
today.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P87-XY2R]; Wells Fargo Workers Claim
Retaliation for Playing By the Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/27/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-workers-
claim-retaliation-for-playing-by-the-rules.html [https://perma.ce/QY7F-
EMW2] (Sept. 26, 2016) (5,300 employees fired for ethics violations); "You
Should Resign": Watch Sen. Elizabeth Warren Grill Wells Fargo CEO John
Stumpf, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/20/494738797/you-
should-resign-watch-sen-elizabeth-warren-grill-wells-fargo-ceo-j hn-stumpf
[https://perma.cc/U7CH-FZAM ] (Sept. 20, 2016).
7 328 U.S. 680 (1946). Under Mt. Clemens, if the plaintiff/employees succeed in
proving that the entire corpus of timekeeping records are "inaccurate or
inadequate," the plaintiffs benefit from a presumption that permits them to
proffer favorable testimonial evidence. Id. at 680. This presumption allows
plaintiffs to prove their compensable time "as a matter of just and reasonable
inference." Id. This lowers the quantum of proof required of employees and
permits them to introduce testimony regarding their recollection of their
hours worked and to rely on representative evidence taken from a subset of
plaintiffs to establish hours worked across a larger class. Doo Nam Yang v.
ACBL Corp., 427 F. Supp. 2d 327, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("it is possible for
plaintiff to meet this burden by relying on his recollection alone."); Reich v.
Cole Enters., Inc., 901 F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D. Ohio 1993) ("[s]ince the
company did not keep records of actual hours worked, the Court may look to
employee testimony to determine the amount of unpaid time worked per
day"). See also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. - (2016). A ruling
can also be based on expert or investigator estimates of the amount of
unrecorded work. Reich, 901 F. Supp. at 261 (relying on computations by the
DOL investigator). Employers are then precluded "from using time records to
rebut the employees' proof of back pay." Solis v. Supporting Hands, 2013 WL
1897822, at * 23. Courts have been generally unsympathetic to arguments
that a plaintiff s testimony about the number of hours worked is self-serving
and speculative, admonishing employers that the failure of proof is their own
fault for failure to keep better records. Dominguez v. Quigley's Irish Pub,
Inc., 790 F. Supp.2d 803, 812-13 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC,
763 F. Supp. 2d 979, 989 (W.D. Tenn. 2011).
8 Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 680.
9 However, non-compliance with record keeping is often treated as evidence
that the employer's failure to pay wages was "willful." See, e.g., Porcal v.
Ciuffo, No. 10-cv-40016-TSH, 2013 WL 3989668, at *5 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2013)
(holding failure to maintain accurate records deemed as evidence of
willfulness); Pineda v. Masonry Constr., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); Monroe, 763 F. Supp.2d at 991-92 (holding that adjusting
employee timecards to eliminate overtime pay was evidence of willfulness to
support liquidated damages award); Doo Nam Yang, 427 F. Supp.2d at 335
4
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arising from software use (or misuse) may be underestimated or
overlooked by employers, who pay little heed to the type of
software they are using or the behavioral cues it presents to the
user.
In the rush to identify algorithmic methods for finding
violations of the FLSA and related wage and hour laws, the
government's focus has been on employer data, not on time
keeping software that generates the data.10 We posit that there
needs to be greater attention paid to the software that produces
the data and the behaviors and incentives of the individuals
making and using the software. This article thus considers
electronic timekeeping systems through the lens of behavioral
compliance, a field that has emerged from the study of
behavioral economics," ethics,12 and organizational and
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding failure to keep records as evidence of willfulness).
"Willful" violations of the FLSA are subject to liquidated damages and a
longer statute of limitations. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128
(1988); Monroe, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 992 (evidence "that supervisors adjusted
hours recorded by technicians to eliminate overtime pay" supported "willful"
determination, which extends statute of limitations of 3 years instead of two).
10 For example, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
has recently proposed new rules that would require employers to report their
employees' earnings by job category, sex, race, and ethnicity in aggregated
pay bands, in order for the agency to assess possible pay discrimination. See
Questions and Answers, Notice of Proposed Changes to the EEO-I to Collect
Pay Data from Certain Employers, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMM'N (last visited Sept. 18, 2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/eeolsurvey/2016-eeo-
lproposed changes qa.cfm [https://perma.cc/5QAQ-9TLG]. As we explain
further in Part VI below, we recommend that the U.S. Department of Labor
amend and update its recordkeeping regulations to target employers'
timekeeping practices and procedures, not necessarily that the agency
demand additional pay data from employers-which are the outputs from
timekeeping systems. In this sense, this article's process-focused proposal
differs from the EEOC's outputs-based proposed reporting rules.
11 See Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1474 (1998) ("behavioral
economics allow us to model and predict behavioral relevant to law with the
tools of traditional economic analysis, but with more accurate assumptions
about human behavior, and more accurate predictions and prescriptions
about law."); see also Yuval Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral
Law and Economics, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 225-226 (2014) ("the common theme in the literature on [behavioral
ethics] is that unethical behaviors are not the product of explicit choices to do
wrong but rather are largely the product of . . . mindless choice . . . . Another
common theme . . . is the need to protect our self-image to resolve the
dissonance between believing that we are good people are our desire to
maximize self-interest.").
12 Arthur Brief, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS
ETHICS (De Cremer & Tenbrunsel eds., 2012) ("'Behavioral ethics' entails the
social scientific study of ethical behavior.'); David D. Cremer & Ann
Tenbrunsel, On Understanding the Need for a Behavioral Business Ethics
Approach 4-5 in BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS ETHICS (De Cremer & Tenbrunsel eds.,
5
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managerial behavior. 13 Behavioral compliance is concerned with
people's decision-making and motivations around "cheating" - a
term of art referring to unethical behavior, where illegal conduct
represents "an especially troubling form of cheating."14
Deploying a behavioral compliance framework, we are the first
authors to examine thirteen commonly used timekeeping
programs and catalog the ways in which such programs enable
or discourage cheating behavior.
We also develop a critical typology for understanding and
ultimately regulating this space: Category A software tends to
include facially neutral features that can be used for either
legitimate or illegitimate purposes. For example, a software
feature designed to allow supervisors to edit an employee's time
entry could be used lawfully to correct an employee's mistake, or
unlawfully to reduce an employee's time worked to avoid
overtime. Category B software includes none of these dual-use
features, and instead actively minimizes supervisors'
opportunities to cheat. In this sense, Category B programs
resemble what Jonathan Zittrain and others have called a
"trusted system," which limits the ability of an untrusted party
to engage in unauthorized conduct.15 Category B software, for
2012) ("the behavioral approach... explicitly argues that much unethical
behavior occurs outside the awareness of individual actors . . . [and] is
supported by recent research on morality, intuition and affect"; "some
contexts may be sufficiently compelling for almost anyone to engage in
unethical behavior. Arriving at a more complete understanding of these
circumstances should enable leaders to create organizations that are more
ethical.").
13 Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Ethics, Behavioral Compliance 2 in
JENNIFER ARLEN, ED. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND
FINANCIAL MISDEALING (forthcoming) ("The label 'behavioral compliance' can
be attached to the design and management of compliance that draws from
this wider range of behavioral predictions about individual and
organizational behavior.").
14 Langevoort, supra note 13 ("Research in behavioral ethics uses 'cheating' as
its key word to describe what good ethics is not, and treats illegal behavior as
an especially troubling form of cheating.").
15 This represents somewhat of an imprecise use of the phrase "trusted system"
which relates to "adding several hardware components to computers to create
greater security for encryption, storage and software." Ryan Roemer, Trusted
Computing, Digital Rights Management, and the Fight for Copyright Control
on Your Computer, 2003 UCLA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECH. 8 (2003). The
concept was subsequently imported into discussions of digital rights
management o prevent copyright infringement. See, e.g., Mark Stefik,
Trusted Systems, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 78, 79 (March 1997) (trusted systems
consist of "techniques that render a system trustworthy"); Mark Gimbel,
Some Thoughts on the Implications of Trusted Systems for Intellectual
Property Law, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1671, 1672 (1998) ("Many different types of
trusted systems are possible: trusted players, for playing audio or video
works; trusted servers, for distributing works over the Internet; even trusted
printers, for printing protected documents."). Jonathan Zittrain offers a more
6
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example, does not permit supervisors to edit employees' time
entries directly. Instead, supervisors may accept or reject an
employee's time entry, but only the employee has the power to
change the time entered. 16 The differences in the two categories'
architecture is significant from a behavioral compliance
perspective: the forced interaction between manager and
employee in Category B acts as a form of real-time mutual
surveillance, whereby both parties hold each other to their
compliance obligations.1 7 By contrast, Category A software can
disguise and legitimize noncompliant acts, leaving any discovery
and correction of managers' cheating - if it even occurs - until
long after the fact.
The differences between the timekeeping software in
Categories A and B can be traced back to the two different
regulatory regimes that govern electronic timekeeping: the U.S.
Department of Labor's (DOL) recordkeeping regulations, which
were enacted pursuant to the FLSA, 18 and U.S. Department of
Defense audit guidelines, which are described in the
department's Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) Manual.
The DOL guidelines apply broadly to all employers covered by
the FLSA; the DCAA guidelines apply only to those employers
who contract with the federal government. The DOL regulations
have not been updated since the 1980s, assume paper-based
records, and pay little attention to the possibility of supervisor
edits to workers' underlying time records.19 The FLSA's
recordkeeping rules are further marginalized because they
cannot be enforced through a private cause of action, although
violations are sometimes treated as evidence of an employer's
adaptive definition of the term: "[tirusted systems are systems that can be
trusted by outsiders against the people who use them." Jonathan Zittrain,
The Generative Internet, 119 HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1974, 1998 (2006); see
also Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient:
Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Systems, 52 STANFORD
L. REV. 1201 (2000) ("A trusted system is one that can be trusted by a rights-
holder as against the user of the system- even if the physical system is in the
custody of the user.").
16 A third type of software, Category A/B, consists of software whose default
functionality is characteristic of Category A (susceptible to both legitimate
and illegitimate uses), but the software maker also offers Category B features
as a (little known) alternative configuration. For more details, see infra note
75.
17 Langevoort supra note 13 at 16-18 (discussing surveillance) and 15-16
(discussing the importance of minimizing the lag time between discovered
cheating and interventions).
18 As discussed further in Part II infra, some states have their own wage and
hour recordkeeping regulations. State-level laws vary in their rigor and
applicability across employers.
19 See infra Section V.A.
7
7
Tippett et al.: WHEN TIMEKEEPING SOFTWARE UNDERMINES COMPLIANCE
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
2017 When Timekeeping Software Undermines Compliance 8
willful non-compliance with substantive rules.20 Moreover,
many employers view the larger ecosystem of wage and hour
laws within which recordkeeping rules are situated as outdated
and onerous.21 Category A timekeeping software resides
primarily within this loose regulatory structure.
By contrast, the DCAA guidelines scrutinize an employer's
processes for ensuring the integrity of workers' time records.22
The DCAA Manual advises against allowing supervisors to edit
employee timecards if those supervisors are also responsible for
meeting budgets, 23 presumably because the situation creates
strong incentives to edit employee time downward. The audit
guidelines' clear focus on process integrity24 created demand for
Category B timekeeping software that limits opportunities for
cheating. Recordkeeping transgressions-and in particular,
knowing alterations to records-are viewed as a fraud on the
government, and can trigger sanctions ranging from contract
cancellation to criminal penalties.25 We posit that the contrast
between the two categories of timekeeping software - and the
potential of Category A software to enable law breaking by bad-
20 The record keeping regulations can only be enforced by the Department of
Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Arencibia v. 2401 Restaurant Corp., 831 F.
Supp.2d 164, 180 (D.D.C. 2011); East v. Bullock's Inc., 34 F. Supp.2d 1176,
1182 (D. Ariz. 1998). However, non-compliance with record keeping is often
treated as evidence that the employer's failure to pay wages was "willful." See
supra note 9.
21 See, e.g., The Fair Labor Standards Act: Is it Meeting the Needs of the
Twenty-First Century Workplace?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Workforce
Protections, Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 112th Cong. 21 (2001)
(Statement of Richard L. Alfred, Partner, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP) ("The Fair
Labor Standards Act is an anachronism in today's economy. This has led to
an explosion of litigation over the past decade that has imposed enormous-
in some cases catastrophic-burdens on employers.").
22 DEP'T OF DEF., DEF. CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY, DCAA CONTRACT AUDIT
MANUAL 5-909 (2016) [hereinafter "DCAA Manual" or the "Manual"] ("The
contractor should have procedures to assure that labor hours are accurately
recorded and that any corrections to timekeeping records are documented,
including appropriate authorizations and approvals. When evaluating the
contractor's timekeeping procedures, the auditor should consider whether the
procedures are adequate to maintain the integrity of the Timekeeping
System.").
23 Id. at 5-907.f ("supervisors who are accountable for meeting contract budgets
should not have the opportunity to initiate or change employee time
charges").
24 Id. at 5-909, 5-902 ("To assess control risk on the labor system as low and
reduce substantive testing, the contractor's system should have: An effective
method to monitor the overall integrity of the Labor/Timekeeping System"),
5-904 ("The purpose of the audit is to evaluate the adequacy of and the
contractor's compliance with the labor system's internal controls"), 5-905 ("In
many instances, control activities may be embedded in the contractor's IT
system").
25 See infra Section V.B.
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actors - signals a problem with the DOL's record keeping
regulations.
The article thus proceeds as follows. In Part II, we provide a
brief overview of relevant wage and hour laws. This serves as
the necessary backdrop for understanding the respects in which
Category A software undermines wage and hour protections.
Part III describes the methodology used to collect the electronic
timekeeping software data examined here. Part IV illustrates
the architecture and features of Category A and B timekeeping
software, and explores how Category A can undermine wage and
hour law. Part IV also applies social science research to Category
B software, and argues that such software limits cheating by
requiring more overt dishonest acts on a supervisor's part to
effectuate the cheating. Part V describes the influence of
recordkeeping rules on software design, and Part VI offers
recommendations to the Department of Labor for amending
those rules.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF WAGE AND HOUR LAW
This Part provides a brief summary of aspects of federal and
state wage and hour law that are implicated in the functionality
of timekeeping software.
The FLSA is the primary federal law that governs workers'
wages and hours. Congress enacted the statute in 1938 to
protect workers from "substandard wages and oppressive
working hours."26 For the most part, the basic minimum wage
and overtime protections provided by the statute remain intact
in their original form.27 It is worth pausing here for effect: the
main law regulating work hours and pay for most employees in
the United States has remained unchanged since before the
Second World War. The FLSA requires covered employers to pay
a minimum wage for each hour worked,28 and an overtime
premium for any hour worked over forty in a given week.29 Some
employees are exempt from one or both requirements if they
meet certain compensation-based and duty-based requirements
set forth in the regulations.30
26 S. REP. No. 75-884 (1937).
27 Nantiya Ruan, Same Law, Different Day: A Survey of the Last Thirty Years of
Wage Litigation and its Impact on Low-Wage Workers, 30 HOFSTRALAB. & EMP.
L. J. 355, 357 (2013).
28 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2015).
29 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2015).
30 The federal regulations defining overtime exemptions are set forth at 29
C.F.R. 541. Employer practices relating to classifying employees as "exempt"
or "non-exempt" from overtime are beyond the scope of this project.
9
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Some states and localities have their own wage and hour
laws.31 States and cities may require hourly wages that are
higher than the federal minimum, 32 or may apply a lower hourly
wage to workers who are exempt from the FLSA. 33 States can
establish additional requirements for employees to qualify as
exempt. They can also impose additional rules regarding unpaid
break and leave time, maximum hours, pay stubs, and other
aspects of wage and hour law.34
The use, misuse, and functionality of timekeeping software
primarily affects employees paid on an hourly basis because
their wages are a function of the number of hours worked.
Hourly employees represented 58.5% of workers in the United
States as of 2015.35 Many of their employers are covered by the
FLSA, which regulates any employer engaged in interstate
commerce with two or more employees and annual sales of at
least $500,000.36 Those not covered by the FLSA are frequently
covered by state laws, which often cover substantially all
employers in the state.37
31 See State Labor Laws, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIVISION (last
visited Nov. 28, 2016), http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/state.htm
[https://perma.cc/FPW5-BEMF].
32 California, New York Enact US-Highest $15 Minimum Wages, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (last updated Apr. 5, 2016),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/98cddb672d82427cb9lOb98c77fdlc4a/california-
governor-set-approve-highest-minimum-wage [https://perma.cc/K92W-9SSD].
33 Minimum Wage Laws in the States August 1, 2016, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
WAGE AND HOUR DIVISIoN (2016),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm [https://perma.cc/K6YS-
YEAR].
34 See, e.g., Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a) (imposing a requirement regarding itemized
wage statements)
35 U.S. Bureau of Lab. Stat., Characteristics of Minimum Wage Workers, 2014,
BLS Reports (April 2016), http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/minimum-
wage/2015/home.htm [https://perma.cc/7FV6-MWYJ].
36 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (2015).
37 GREGORY MCGILLIVARY, WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY
174, 844 (California law "applies when an employment relationship exists";
Massachusetts minimum wage covers all employers, other wage payment
statutes exclude certain occupations); Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.005 (2015)
(covering all employers). Compare 7 Colo. Code Regs. § 1103-1 (cover retail
and service industries, businesses that "provide services to other commercial
firms," restaurants and other food service businesses, and health and medical
businesses). A few only cover employers not covered by the FLSA. Kan. Stat.
Ann. 44-1202 (2016) (covering all employers not covered by the FLSA, except
those in the agricultural industry or domestic service); Tex. Lab. Code. Ann. §
62.151 (West 2015). A few states do not have wage laws with broader
coverage than the FLSA. See also McGILLIVARY, supra, at 4 (Alabama
"primarily relies on" the FLSA).
10
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Violations of federal and state wage and hour laws can occur
in a variety of ways.38 Wage and hour violations sometimes
involve failing or refusing to pay a non-exempt employee for
some or all of her compensable time, a practice colloquially
referred to as "wage theft."39 For example, an employer might
force an employee to work "off the clock" by instructing her to
begin work before she "punches in" at the start of her shift, or
continue working after she "punches out" at the end of the day.40
If the unpaid hour(s) result in an effective wage rate below
minimum wage, the employer violates the FLSA's minimum
wage requirement. If the unpaid hour(s) worked were in excess
of forty per week, then the employer violates the FLSA's
overtime requirement.4 1
Non-payment of wages for all hours worked may also
represent a separate state wage and hour violation. For
example, state wage rules may require that all earned wages be
paid within a certain time, such as semi-monthly.42 An employer
that fails to pay the entirety of the amount owed thus violates
38 Many wage violations-such as misclassifying workers as independent
contractors or as "exempt" from overtime-do not implicate timekeeping
software because the employer typically fails to keep any records of a
misclassified employee's hours. Our focus in this project is wage and hour
violations involving hourly employees who are eligible for minimum wage
and overtime, where there are at least some records of hours worked. These
are the employees whose wages are most dependent upon the use, and
misuse, of timekeeping software.
39 See Jan Gabriel Nanos, 17 No. 10 N.Y. EMP. L. LETTER 5 (2010) (defining wage
theft as "failing to pay minimum wage; failing to pay overtime; requiring off-
the-clock work; pilfering tips; and misclassifying workers"); Stephen Lee,
Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 655, 661
(2014) (defining wage theft as "nonpayment of wages for work performed");
Todd Palo, Minimum Wage, Justifiably Unenforced? 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
36, 40 (2010) (defining wage theft as "when an employer deprives an employee
of pay which he or she is due as remuneration for work performed.")
40 Disputes periodically arise over whether time worked before or after a shift
qualifies as "compensable." For example, in Integrity Staffing Solutions v.
Busk, employees argued unsuccessfully that waiting in an antitheft security
screening line was compensable. 135 S.Ct. 513, 516 (2014) (finding such time
uncompensable). This article does not focus on such disputes, except insofar as
such cases bear upon an employer's record keeping obligations, and the
evidentiary consequences of a finding of non-compliance.
41 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart to Pay $54 Million to Settle Suit Over
Wages, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 9, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/10/business/10walmart.html
[https://perma.cc/EG8E-NBDF] (alleging that supervisors instructed
employees to "clock out" early to avoid paying overtime; court ruled against
employees on routine off-the-clock work).
42 N.Y. Lab. Law § 191 (McKinney 2016) (dealing with frequency of payments);
N.Y. Lab Law § 190 (McKinney 2016) (defining wages as "the earnings of an
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rules regarding timely paychecks.43 State wage rules may also
prohibit deductions from an employee's wages unless they are
made for the benefit of the employee, are expressly authorized
by the statute, or are authorized by the individual employee in
writing.44 Reducing an employee's hours worked within a
timekeeping system, because it ultimately affects the amount
paid to the employee, could be considered an impermissible
deduction.45
Although the FLSA does not require the employer to provide
meal and rest breaks, state law may also demand that meal
and/or rest breaks be provided to non-exempt employees who
work a shift of a certain duration. For example, California law
requires that employees receive one unpaid meal period of at
least thirty minutes, if the shift exceeds five hours.4 6 If the
employer fails to provide the meal break, the employer owes the
employee compensation both for the time worked, as well as an
additional hour of pay.4 7 California also requires that employers
43 Id.
44 N.Y. Lab. Law § 193 (McKinney 2012); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
12, § 195-2.1 (2016); Illinois Public Act 78-914, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/9
(2015); Scott Miller, Combatting Wage Theft in Illinois: Administering and
Enforcing the IWPCA, 47 URB. LAW 665, 693 (2015)
45 State rules regarding the timeliness of paychecks and deductions from pay are
accompanied by civil penalties. N.Y. LAB. LAw § 197 (McKinney 2011); 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 115/14 (2015). Some states and cities have expressly sought to
crack down on wage theft by enacting wage theft prevention statute. 2015
Conn. Acts 15-86 (Reg. Sess.); California Wage Theft Protection Act, 2011 CAL.
STAT. Ch. 655; Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT.
115 (2011), D.C. Wage Theft Prevention Act of 2013; Anti-Wage Theft
Ordinance, Chicago, IL 2013. New York's 1997 Unpaid Wages Prohibition Act,
for example, imposes criminal penalties for failing to pay employee wages in
accordance with state law. N.Y. Lab Law 198-a; Nanos, supra note 39
(describing a 2010 New York law that expanded criminal penalties for wage
theft): Lee, supra note 39 at 662-665, 674 (describing the movement to
criminalize wage theft); California Labor Commissioner Launches Criminal
Investigation Press Release IR #2012-09, CALIFORNIA LABOR COMMISSIONER
(February 27, 2012) http://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2012/IR2012-09.html
[https://perma.cc/BK4V-MAUY] (creating a criminal investigation unit
"designed to investigate employers who perpetrate wage theft and other
criminal activities against workers); 820 Ill. Comp. Stat 115/14 (2015). New
York also enacted a subsequent law in 2010, the Wage Theft Prevention Act,
which increased civil penalties to 100% of the unpaid wages. N.Y. Lab Law §
198; Nanos, supra note 39.
46 Cal. Lab Code § 512. The employee may waive the meal period if the shift does
not exceed 6 hours. RICHARD SIMMONS, WAGE AND HOUR MANUAL FOR
CALIFORNIA EMPLOYERS 166 (13th Ed. 2008). If it exceeds 6 hours but is less
than 10 hours, the employee may take a meal period while "on duty" provided
it is memorialized in a written agreement and "the nature of the work prevents
the employee from being relieved of all duty." Id.
47 Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7; Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 4th 1004
(2012) (holding that employer must merely a meal break available, rather than
12
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make a paid rest period available to non-exempt employees for
ten minutes for every four hours worked.4 8 If the employer
requires the employee to work during any rest period, the
employer owes the employee an additional hour of pay.4 9 A state
meal or rest break violation could become an FLSA violation to
the extent the employer fails to pay for the time worked and
inclusion of that time would have triggered overtime pay.50 It
may also violate the FLSA if including the missed break time in
the employee's hours worked pushed the employee's effective
wage rate below the minimum wage.
Turning specifically to timekeeping, employers tend to
establish two types of workplace timekeeping rules: employee
conduct rules, and default rules regarding how time is
calculated. Both types of rules must comply with federal, state,
and local wage and hour laws. An employer may have employee
conduct rules regarding timeliness, attendance, and
unauthorized overtime-for example, a rule that employees
must obtain a supervisor's permission before working overtime.
However, should the employee violate the employer's rule and
work unauthorized overtime, the employer must nevertheless
pay the employee the overtime premium, as federal and/or state
law requires. The employee can, however, be disciplined or even
fired for failing to abide by the employer's conduct rule, unless
the conduct rule is itself a violation of federal or state law.5 1
Federal and state law yields, in limited respect, to employer
rules regarding the calculation of hours worked. For example,
employers are permitted to engage in "rounding" of employee
time stamps forward or backward, as long as the practice is not
used to systematically disadvantage employees.52 As the U.S.
requiring them to take a break whether they want them or not); Simmons,
supra note 46 at 169.
48 Simmons, supra note 46 at 172.
49 Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7.
50 29 C.F.R. § 785.19; McGone v. Contract Callers, Inc. 49 F.Supp.3d, 364 368
(2014). See also A. Kevin Troutman, Automatically Deducting for Meal Breaks
Can be Costly, FISHER PHILLIPS (Aug. 1, 2012),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-newsletters-article-automatically-
deducting-for-meal-breaks -can-be-costly [https://perma.ce/T7NM-8NDS].
51 An example of such a rule might be a rule that prohibits an employee from
taking any breaks during a lengthy 10-hour shift. Many state laws guarantee
breaks and meal periods for shifts exceeding a specified duration.
52 29 C.F.R. § 785.48 ("Rounding' practices. It has been found that in some
industries, particularly where time clocks are used, there has been the practice
for many years of recording the employees' starting time and stopping time to
the nearest 5 minutes, or to the nearest one-tenth or quarter of an hour.
Presumably, this arrangement averages out so that the employees are fully
compensated for all the time they actually work. For enforcement purposes this
practice of computing working time will be accepted, provided that it is used in
13
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Department of Labor's regulations put it, a facially neutral
rounding rule would both round up and round down,
"averag[ing] out so that the employees are fully compensated for
all the time they actually worked."53 Rounding rules are
discussed in greater detail in Part IV.C below.
An employer might also prefer to adopt timekeeping rules
that automatically deduct meal and/or break periods from the
employee's time worked. Federal law-and state law in some
cases-permit meal periods to be deducted automatically,
provided that the employee has a mechanism for informing the
supervisor of a missed break that should not be deducted.54 By
contrast, federal law presumes that rest breaks between five and
twenty minutes "must be counted as hours worked";55 and
California likewise requires that such breaks be paid. Counting
a short rest break as unpaid time could therefore violate federal
law or state law, depending on the circumstances.
III.METHODOLOGY
This article's analysis of timekeeping software was based on
a review of the functionality of thirteen different timekeeping
software programs, as recounted on the software maker's
website or in YouTube demonstration and training videos.56
These programs were selected primarily based on whether
instructional YouTube videos were posted illustrating the
software's functionality, following a YouTube search for
such a manner that it will not result, over a period of time, in failure to
compensate the employees properly for all the time they have actually
worked.").
53 Id.
54 See, e.g., Lopez v. G.A.T. Airline Ground Support, Inc., No. 09-CV-2268-IEG,
2010 WL 2839417 at * 3 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2010) (no record keeping duty under
state law to record exact time of meal period); Berger v. Cleveland Clinic
Found., No. 1:05 CV 1508, 2007 WL 2902907 at *13 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2007).
55 29 C.F.R. § 785.48.
56 The software included in the analysis are: TSheets, Patriot Software, Count
Me In LLC, ADP Workforce Now, TimeKron, Hubstaff, Infinitime,
Quickbooks/Intuit, WeWorked, GHG, Kronos, SpringAhead, and
BigTimeSoftware.
We excluded companies that did not appear to serve a timesheet functionality
for employers to use with non-exempt employees. Rather, some software
programs are designed for individual use, for example, for individuals to
monitor their productivity; for freelancers to track and invoice their time; or
for organizations to bill for projects. These included CaseFox, Chromata,
Harvest Time Tracking and Clicksoftware. These programs did not appear to
have broader functionality for use in organizations to record time and pay
employees working on an hourly basis some programs included in the sample
had the functionality to bill for projects, but that functionality was integrated
within or alongside functionality for tracking non-exempt employee time).
14
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"timekeeping software"; "employee timekeeping software;" and
"DCAA compliant timekeeping software" and similar terms.
Secondarily, some programs were selected based on a Google
search for timekeeping software. Additionally, one of the authors
(Eigen) has spent many years reviewing and evaluating data
from a variety of different commonly used timekeeping systems,
and has served as an expert witness on both the plaintiff side
and defendant side in wage and hour class and collective actions.
Importantly, the goal of this project was not to survey all
timekeeping software options on the market today, nor even to
evaluate a random sample. Instead, the aim was to investigate
the range of architecture and functions available, including in
some of the most widely used programs.
Further, we chose not to purchase and install timekeeping
software for two reasons. First, timekeeping programs are quite
expensive;5 7 purchasing and installing thirteen or more
Several software makers appear to use a "software as a service" pricing
model, charging organizations at a fixed fee per month for each user, and
offering premium software packages at a higher per-user-month fee. See, e.g.,
TimeKron, Pricing, SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES, http://softwaretech.com/time-
clock-software/pricing/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2016) (charging between $750
and $2,950 for its software, depending on the size of the employer). To
illustrate, a company with 50 employees paying per user-month fee could
expect to pay anywhere between $1,194 per year and $11,520 per year for its
timekeeping software. In other words, timekeeping software can be quite
expensive and is a non-trivial budget item for companies using the software.
See Time and Labor, ADP FOR MIDSIZED BUSINESS,
http://www.adp.com/solutions/midsized-business/products/workforce-
now/time-and-labor.aspx [https://perma.cc/MBP4-BS43] (last visited Sept. 17,
2016) (describing a package of 'out-of-the-box features, as well as "popular
add-ons", although it was unclear whether they sell the software as a service
or as a platform); Timesheet Software. Sign Up!, WEWORKED,
https://www.weworked.com [https://perma.cc/NH6P-Q574] (cost ranging from
1.99 per month to 49.99 per month, depending on the number of users);
Clockwise Pricing, CLOCKWISE, http://www.ghg.com/pricing/
[https://perma.cc/L6FU-DUXS] (cost per month ranging from $5 per user-
month to $9 per user-month based on chosen features); Bigtime Increases Our
Operating Margins By 25%, BIGTIME, https://www.bigtime.net/pricing/
[https://perma.cc/6BRF-AEWX] (cost ranging from $5.60 per user/month to
$19.20 per user/month depending on features, with an additional $5 per user-
month charge for DCAA compliance). Timekeeping software can be quite
expensive when deployed organization-wide. For example, a publicly
available contract with a Pennsylvania county for a Kronos timekeeping
software license priced it at $175,275, not including maintenance,
implementation, or hosting. Amendment No. 1. to Agreement for Application
Hosting and Technology Support Services between Luzern County,
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programs is cost prohibitive. Second, although some software
programs offered free trials for a limited time, the terms of
service appear to prohibit research usage.58
Nevertheless, the videos, descriptions, and software tutorials
available online provide a high-level view of the architecture and
operation of an array of electronic timekeeping programs. In
some cases, the YouTube videos originated from the software
makers themselves. In others, the videos were posted by third
parties reviewing or demonstrating the software to others. One
lengthy video-involving the Kronos timekeeping software-
consisted of a training at the University of California-Santa
Barbara (seemingly led by a university employee) for new
managers. Some of the videos were viewed many times; the
Santa Barbara training had more than 15,000 views.5 9
The sample included a range of software makers, from
startups to large, established companies. The largest companies
in the sample included Kronos, ADP, Quickbooks/Intuit, and
GHG. On its website, Kronos claims that "tens of thousands" of
organizations use its software, "including more than half of the
Fortune 1000[j"6o ADP is a publicly traded company, primarily
known for its payroll services. Its website claims that it pays "26
million (1 in 6) workers in the US," although it does not describe
the its timekeeping software market share.61
Some of the companies in the sample appeared to be newer
and closer to the size of a startup, based on descriptions on their
websites. If one believes the claims on website materials and
promotional materials, these smaller software solutions were
58 For example, Hubstaff offered a free trial, but its Terms of Service contract
claimed that the "Service" is a "valuable trade secret" and contains
"proprietary content, information and material" protected by intellectual
property laws, and authorized use "only for the purposes set forth in these
Terms." Although the contract did not expressly prohibit use of the software
for research purposes, we were concerned that Hubstaff (or other software
makers offering free trials), would allege as much, or allege that disclosure of
any results of our testing would breach the confidentiality provision of the
contract. Hubstaff Terms of Service, HUBSTAFF, https://hubstaff com/terms
[https://perma.cc/GQB3-CUWP] (last visited Sept. 17, 2016).
59 Rich K, UCSB Training Video, Kronos Workforce, YOUTUBE, (May 16, 2014)
https://www.youtube.com/watchv=1HPSj2Mdlh4 (last visited Sept. 25,
2016).
60 When is Time Not on Your Side?, KRONOS,
http://www.kronos.com/download/thank-
you.aspx?did=1390&rr=0&LangType= 1033# [https://perma.cc/4FRE-KP82]
(Direct download) at 8.
61 Corporate Overview Sept. 2016, ADP,
http://www.adp.com/-/media/Corporate%200verview/ADP-Corporate-
Overview.ashx [https://perma.cc/JU7X-F2CR] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016).
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also deployed widely. For example, TSheets, a startup founded
in 2006,62 projected that it would process $8 billion in payroll
over a 12 month period.63 The size and customer base for other
companies in the sample were less clear from their respective
websites. Some of these appeared to be smaller software
businesses targeted primarily for use by small employers.6 4
YouTube videos and website materials provide a high degree
of certainty about some aspects of timekeeping software, and
limited visibility into others. These sources provide a high
degree of certainty about the availability of certain features in
software programs-where those features are demonstrated in
YouTube videos, in videos or screenshots on the software
maker's website, in marketing content from the software maker,
or in its technical support documents.
Videos present some ambiguity, however, as to the default
settings of the software.65 Without using the software, it is
difficult to know whether a feature illustrated in a screenshot or
video represents the default configuration for the software, or
settings adopted by a particular employer. For example, if a
video shows a window popping up that asks supervisors to
scrutinize and approve/reject overtime, it is impossible to tell
whether the window represents the software's default settings,
or whether the software simply enables the employer to
implement pop-ups for supervisors, one of which could pertain
to overtime hours. Indeed, the demonstrator of the software-
whether a third party or the software maker him/herself-may
be demonstrating a customized option. Additionally, the
software may have changed in the intervening time since the
video was posted. At most, we are able to infer that the software
featured in the video can be used in the way illustrated.
IV. SOFTWARE FEATURES THAT UNDERMINE WAGE AND
HOUR LAWS
As explained above, Category A timekeeping software can
enable cheating, and can undermine wage and hour compliance.
62 TSheets'Life Story, TSHEETS, https://www.tsheets.com/about/
[https://perma.cc/Z75C-H54N] (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
63 TSheets Raises $15 million To Grow Bigger, Faster, Stronger, TSHEETS, (Oct.
5. 2015), https://www.tsheets.com/resources/funding-summit-partners-boise
[https://perma.cc/7KU8-8RAY] (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).
64 Support Site for WeWorked.com, WEWORKED,
http://support.weworked.com/category/timesheets-approvals/
[https://perma.cc/9UKM-AU35] (contemplating a company size between 3
users and 100 users).
65 Of course, the myriad different packages offered by software makers suggests
that there is no single default setting even within a single program.
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Broadly, the software features observed among Category A
programs that can facilitate non-compliance include those that:
(i) present situational cues that encourage supervisors to make
unlawful edits to workers' raw time and attendance data; (ii) flag
certain types of time entry for further scrutiny, and perhaps
unlawful editing, by supervisors; and (iii) implement employers'
own wage and hour rules, such as automatic break deductions.
While these features can be used in a manner that complies with
federal and state wage and hour laws, they also permit non-
compliant use. We contrast these features with Category B
software, whose functionality tends to restrict non-compliant
use. Lastly, we examine a common software feature known as
"rounding." Although rounding technically complies with
substantive wage rules, we argue that can have the aggregate
effect of shaving employee time when it interacts with employer
attendance rules.
A. Timecard Editing Features
Category A programs typically allow supervisors to edit time
entered by individual employees. These systems enable
employers to structure permissions, whereby supervisors have
access to the timecards of all of their supervisees. Supervisors
review, edit and approve time logged or submitted by individual
employees. Kronos illustrates this process through the diagram
in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1. Typical Time Edit & Approval Process -
Category A Software66
Typical Automated Process
Suprvtor Edht Right checks
nd Approves Ar. Cut
A u tcafll
Gathered El kctronialy and Proceses ad Oe ChckAwa
The editing functionality varies by software program. The
most common such functionality consists of a button supervisors
press to enable them to edit an entry. These buttons consisted of
a drawing of a hand holding a pen or feather, or a button labeled
66 Selecting an Automated Time and Attendance Solution Workbook, KRONOS, at
15 (July 11, 2016), available at http://www.kronos.com/download/thank-
you.aspx?did=23622320227&rr=0&LangType= 1033# [https://perma.cc/VU3U-
GBFE ] (direct download).
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"edit" (see Appendix, Figures 1 - 2). Also common were features
that allowed supervisors to place a cursor in the individual
employee's time sheet and edit the information, as if it were a
cell in a spreadsheet (see Appendix, Figures 3 - 4). One software
feature illustrates employee time cards on a "Time Slider," with
which administrators may "correct" any "errors" by "simply
clicking and dragging [the slider] to the correct times" (see
Appendix, Figure 5). The software maker's description of the
functionality even includes a picture of a child on a slide,
characterizing the Time Slider as "almost as fun."67
In some cases, the graphical appearance of the editing
feature creates a misleading impression that the underlying
time data is overwritten. For example, in a cursor-based system,
in which the supervisor edits the time as if were a spreadsheet,
the act of "editing" appears to replace the old data with the new.
Likewise, the process of editing time through a slider appears to
the user as an alteration of the original time records, even
though the original records are in fact preserved.68 As discussed
further below, one software program offers menu options to
"delete" a particular entry or set of entries (see Appendix, Figure
6).
The visual appearance of the editing functionality is not
necessarily related to the background functionality of the
software; an employee's time could appear to be overwritten in
the graphical interface, even as the underlying structure of the
software preserves the original data and stores the edit as an
additional line entry. However, as we will discuss in greater
detail below, insights from behavioral compliance, ethics, and
economics teach that the outward appearance that an entry has
been deleted may subtly influence the way that supervisors use
the software. In particular, the suggestion that the data will be
deleted may lead the user to edit the timecard with greater
impunity.69
67 Appendix, Figure 5.
68 TSheets Introductory Overview, TSHEETS,
https://tsheets.wistia.com/medias/nu3smsi7zg [https://perma.cc/2TKL-SJPC]
(last visited Dec. 4 2016) (demonstrating the log generated by edits to employer
timesheets).
69 Jason Dana, George Loewenstein, & Roberto Weber, Ethical Immunity: How
People Violate Their Own Moral Standards Without Feeling They Are Doing
So in BEHAVIORAL Bus. ETHICS 197, 201 (2012) ("people can avoid
accountability for difficult ethical decisions . . . when responsibility for these
decision[s] ... is diffused .... The actions of other people often diffuse
responsibility ... that enables individuals to take self-interested actions they
would eschew if acting unilaterally.").
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Some programs are structured-or can be configured-for
users to provide a reason for the edit. Such functionality could
be helpful for compliance purposes where the listed reasons are
limited to legitimate use of the software, making it more difficult
for users to rationalize unlawful edits. Indeed, the descriptions
of edits are also useful after the fact, when a higher-level
supervisor, auditor, or expert witness analyzes the data to
ensure compliance with wage and hour laws.70 However, some of
the software we observed offers questionable justifications for
employer edits, although it was unclear whether the available
options originated from the employer-user or from the software
program. One video offered the following menu options for
justifying timecard edits: "unapproved - early punch,"
"unapproved - late punch," and "unapproved - out of schedule
punch"71 (see Figure 7, Appendix.). (This video was user-
generated, and may have represented that institutional user's
configuration of the software, rather than default options
furnished by the software provider.) To the extent any of these
reasons were used to justify edits to a timecard that reduced a
worker's compensable time, they are most likely inconsistent
with wage and hour law. As explained in Part II above, while
working unapproved overtime can, in some circumstances, be
the basis for discipline by the employer, including termination,
an employer remains obligated to pay non-exempt employees the
relevant required rate for every hour worked.72 The presence of
such options may lead an uniformed supervisor to believe that
non-payment of overtime is permissible.
Another program offered the option to "Delete all punches
and insert scheduled punches"73 (see Figure 6, Appendix). There
are legitimate uses for the option "Delete all punches and insert
scheduled punches." For example, if an employee comes to work
on her day off to retrieve personal items and punches in and out,
those punches might legitimately be deleted and replaced with
the scheduled punches (i.e. none at all). Likewise, if a
timekeeping system malfunctions and records punches during
an employee's vacation, those erroneous punches might be
deleted and replaced with a pre-set number of hours of vacation
time. However, even these scenarios seem somewhat of a
stretch. In the alternative, such a feature could be used to avoid
an overtime obligation, by substituting an employee's forty-plus
actual hours worked with her forty hour scheduled shift, or
reducing total hours worked in a day or the week. This is
70 See discussion infra at Section IV.E.
71 It is unclear from the training video whether these options come pre-populated
by the software manufacturer or were set up by the user or the user's
administrator.
72 See supra, Part II.
73 Id.
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especially problematic when mid-level managers are directly
and personally incentivized to keep their budgets down, and
minimize labor costs.
Further, after a supervisor edits an employee's time via one
of these functions, the employee is not necessarily informed of
the edit. Indeed, for Category A software, the available YouTube
tutorials and software documentation suggest that edits are not
returned to employees for review or approval.7 4 Instead, the
default process for Category A software-as depicted in the
Kronos illustration in Figure 1 above-would appear to be that
the supervisor "edits and approves" the timecard, which is
forwarded directly to payroll for processing.75 This conforms
74 An employee with access to his or her own time card might have some
visibility into the edits or the final amount approved for payroll.
75 It is somewhat of an oversimplification to describe "default" features for
Kronos, or any other software package, in that offerings and features can vary
considerably by employer size, and may even be customized to reflect the
particular features purchased by the employee. In this respect, the software
makers are somewhat like auto manufacturers, in that they may have various
product models, and then each individual car can have a particular package of
features if the customer is willing to pay.
For example, some software is by default configured as Category A but the
software maker offers alternate packages or "add-ons" with the functionality
of Category B software, where supervisor edits are either disallowed, or where
the edits are automatically returned to the employee for further review. For
example, the default configuration for Kronos software resembles Category A.
However, Kronos offers an add-on called the "Attestation Toolkit" through
which "[e]mployees can review and approve or reject any changes made by
their managers during the current pay period." Attestation Toolkit, KRONOS,
https://www.kronos.com/resources/attestation-tool-kit [https://perma.cc/82QP-
92ZE] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016). Although Kronos does not disclose the
adoption rate for the Attestation Toolkit, one blogger described it as "little-
known." Ryan Baugh, The Little-Known Kronos Toolkit You Should be Using,
VELOCITY (Oct. 23, 2015), https://velocitycloud.com/resources/blog/the-little-
known-kronos-toolkit -you-should-be-using [https://perma.cc/V2Y8-9R4M] (last
visited Sept. 18, 2016). Similarly, SpringAhead's timekeeping software's
default functionality permits employer edits. See SpringAhead Demos,
SpringAhead Admin Review, YouTUBE, (Apr. 8, 2011)
https://www.youtube.com/watch'v=qJCMOvUvU6g (last visited Sept. 18,
2016). However, a defense compliance consultant demonstrated a version of
SpringAhead's software in which that functionality is absent, requiring
employees to submit edits to their own timesheets, suggesting that
SpringAhead makes alternate versions of the software available. See
ReliAscentLLC, SpringAhead Timekeeping Software Demo, YOUTUBE, (Apr.
22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch'v=9lmZBmkvomM (last visited
Sept. 18, 2016). Likewise, BigTime software advertises two versions of its
software-a default version permitting supervisor edits, and a more expensive
"DCAA Compliance" version. See Bigtime Increases Our Operating Margins By
25%, BIGTIME, https://www.bigtime.net/pricing/ [https://perma.cc/42JA-
CSWW] (pricing a DCAA compliance configuration that costs an additional $5
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with Eigen's experience observing dozens of timekeeping
systems in action over the past decade.
In fact, the lack of transparency on the employee's side may
be one of the reasons that wage and hour class actions and
collective actions are so prevalent. Employees may not notice
small infractions that might be brought to their employer's
attention right away. Without the ability to see or notice small
infractions contemporaneously, it is unlikely that well-meaning
employers would ever be put on notice of such issues unless and
until they receive a demand letter or a complaint alleging
system-wide problems on a grand scale. The absence of
transparency may also lead employees to distrust the
timekeeping system, causing them to engage in more dishonest
behavior regarding their own timekeeping. More transparency
ultimately may lead to more honest behavior both by employees
and their supervisors.
The freedom afforded to supervisors to edit subordinate
timecards is unavailable in Category B software. Figure 2, a
diagram from BigTime Software, illustrates this different
functionality.
Y495] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [hereinafter BIGTIME, Expenses] (describing
default version of software "When a user clicks the submit button, it's like a
virtual version of handing in their timesheet. It gives you an electronic
indication that they're done entering time and making changes for the week
and they are ready for you to do whatever it is you'd like to do with that time!
You can edit it, add it to invoices, send it over to QuickBooks or just ignore it!");
DCAA Compliant Timesheet Review & Approval, BIGTIME,
https://www.bigtime.net/dcaa-timesheet-review-and-approval/
[https://perma.cc/2KAP-NSUE] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [hereinafter
BIGTIME, Compliant] (describing DCAA compliant software, "as a manager,
you're not allowed to make edits to [the employee's time]. The system is
sophisticated enough that it can actually lock the things that you're not
allowed to edit.").
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The software is structured to enable only employees to enter
their time, which the supervisor can view.77 Category B software
does not permit the supervisor to make direct edits to employees'
time and attendance data. Instead, managers with concerns
about a timecard have the option of "approving" or "rejecting" a
submission, which the employee can edit and then resubmit.
Some Category B software further prompts employees to provide
a reason for any modification they make to the timesheet.78
Consequently, the structure of Category B software forces the
supervisor to inform and involve the employee in any edits to the
timesheet.
Software that provides supervisors with unchecked
discretion to edit employee time is problematic from a behavioral
compliance standpoint because supervisors have a strong
incentive to limit payroll costs by shaving employee time.79
Software makers openly cater to employer fears about spiraling
76 BIGTIME, Expenses, supra note 75 (in context, this illustration refers to a
version of BigTime software in which supervisors can edit employee
timecards. However, BigTime offers a version of the software in which
managers are not permitted to make edits. See BIGTIME, Compliant, supra
note 75.
77 See BIGTIME, Compliant, supra note 75; see also ReliAscent, supra note 75;
Debbie Sabin, DCAA Compliant Timekeeping Software by GHG (Dec. 10, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watchv=I4kr3bUNTue.
78 See, e.g., Sabin supra note 77.
79 See, e.g., Francoise Carr6 & Chris Tilly, America's Biggest Low-Wage Industry:
Continuity and Change in Retail Jobs (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp't,
Working Paper No. 2009-6, 2008) at 12 ("Managers must sparingly manage
their use of work hours and many retailers control manager access to overtime
for hourly workers (paid time and a half for hours over 40).").
Figure 2:
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payroll costs in their advertising, while carefully avoiding any
statements suggesting that employers will use their software
unlawfully to deprive employees of wages. ADP advertises, for
example, "You can confidently help manage labor costs and
compliance. And answer questions like, '[W]ho's working
overtime?"o80 Kronos advertises that its software can: "boost
employee productivity and engagement while providing real-
time insight into labor data to help control costs and reduce
compliance risk."8 1 These are not outright statements that invite
employers to use the software to shave overtime. Nevertheless,
they suggest hat the questionable features described above play
a central role in the competitive positioning of software
makers.82 In the absence of effective recordkeeping regulation
from the Department of Labor, the market for Category A
software has become somewhat of a race to the bottom.83
Even as software makers place considerable trust in the
honesty of supervisors, that trust does not extend to the hourly
employees themselves. Marketing materials emphasize the
hidden cost of employees that inflate their hours worked, and
pitch their technology as a means to hold hourly employees
accountable.84 Software maker TimeKron, for example, cites an
80 ADP supra note 57.
81 Workforce Ready Timekeeping, KRONOS,
https://www.kronos.com/products/workforce-ready-suite/workforce-ready-
time-keeping [https://perma.cc/6M9G-W8J9] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016).
82 In some respects, the questionable features we describe are analogous to
peer-to-peer file sharing services like Napster, or numbered Swiss bank
accounts, both of which create a predominantly illegitimate use case for their
existence and hide behind the claim that there are possible legitimate uses
too. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001) (rejecting Napster's argument that Napster's file sharing functionality
represents a form of fair use); Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VIRGINIA L.
REV. 680, 685 (2003) (peer to peer software "successfully exploits the
normative distinction between illegal'stealing' and innocuous 'copying"'). By
contrast, there are legitimate primary purpose products and services that
have illegitimate secondary uses, like drones or kitchen knives. The question
is whether these questionable features are more like Napster, or more like a
kitchen knife. Ultimately, we focus less on the taxonomy of these features
than on practical implications from a behavioral compliance standpoint-how
should timekeeping architecture be designed and regulated to ensure more
compliant than noncompliant behavior?
83 See Part V infra. For example, some Category A software makers offer add-on
options that limit supervisor discretion or provide employees with greater
access to information. See supra note 75. These features do not feature
prominently in marketing materials for customers other than defense
contractors. Id.
84 By focusing on wage theft by supervisors against employees, we are not
suggesting that employee inflation of hours is not a problem or does not occur.
Just as supervisors have an incentive to shave hours, so too do employees have
an incentive to inflate their hours. In Predictably Irrational, Dan Ariely cites
estimates that "employees' theft and fraud at the workplace [amount to] $600
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American Payroll Association report that "a company can save
up to 9% on payroll..[b]y eliminating human error, reducing
buddy punching, and getting rid of duplicate data entry."85
Kronos also describes the threat of employee fraud:
Dishonest employees can take advantage of an honor-
based paper timecard system, costing your company
money and demoralizing employees who are honest.
Automating your time and attendance solution can
minimize payments for unworked time and boost
employee morale. Forrester estimates nearly 12
percent of the hourly workforce regularly overstating
two hours of work per pay period can be saved
through automation.86
One client testimonial asserts, "Accountability is way up,
and excess hours are way down."87 Similarly, software maker
Hubstaff asks potential customers, "Have an accountability
problem?"88
Software makers build in functionality to prevent employees
from inflating their hours. Software makers advertise that their
automated or biometric time clock systems eliminate "buddy
punching"89-whereby a co-worker punches in for an absent
colleague.90 Some systems prevent employees from making
billion" annually. Dan Ariely, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES
THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 195 (2010).
85 TimeKron, SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES, http://softwaretech.com/time-clock-
software/ [https://perma.cc/Q5W4-9CNM] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016).
86 Kronos, supra note 66 at 22.
87 Kronos supra note 60 at 7.
88 Dave Nevogt, How a 100% Remote Team Feels About Employee Monitoring
Software, HUBSTAFF BLOG, http://blog.hubstaff.com/employee-monitoring-
software-from-employee-perspective [https://perma.cc/FKQ8-2TLG] (last
visited Sept. 18, 2016).
89 Kronos supra note 66 at 15 ("If buddy punching is an issue for your company,
you will want to make sure the vendor you select offers biometric and
intelligent terminals. With biometric fingertip recognition technology, you can
virtually eliminate time fraud, helping to ensure that the right person is
clocking in and out."); The best way to track employee hours, INTUIT PAYROLL,
http://payroll.intuit.com/additional-services/time-tracking/ (last visited Sept.
18, 2016) ("prevent employee abuse with time clock authentication").
90 TimeKron, supra note 85 ("With automated time clock software in place, the
American Payroll Association reports that a company can save up to 9% on
payroll. By eliminating human error, reducing buddy punching, and getting
rid of duplicate data entry, the savings quickly add up.") Kronos, supra note 60
at 4 ("'Reduce payroll overpayments that put you over budget with automation
that captures punches at the source and then secures the data, applies policies
the same way every time, and stops costly 'buddy punching."').
One YouTube video even includes a clip of an employee attempting to log in for
a friend, followed by the statement: "stop buddy punching in its tracks."
25
25
Tippett et al.: WHEN TIMEKEEPING SOFTWARE UNDERMINES COMPLIANCE
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
2017 When Timekeeping Software Undermines Compliance 26
changes to their own timecards, although this more commonly
appears as an option for employers to configure according to
their preferences.91 By contrast, software makers in the
Category A space do not approach supervisors' motives with the
same level of suspicion. Instead, software makers present the
edit-based functionality merely as a convenient device for edits
that are consistent with wage and hour laws.
We are not making any empirical claims regarding the
frequency with which Category A functionality is used for
illegitimate purposes. However, behavioral compliance theory
suggests that the structure of Category A software, and the
situational cues it presents, are more likely to produce
problematic behavior than software that falls into Category B.
Behavior compliance and ethics92 research suggests that
cheating is often not the result of a few bad apples, but rather
that most people will cheat in small increments on a frequent
basis, depending on the situational cues and circumstances.93
SkyWire, Stop Buddy Punching in its Tracks with Count Me In, YOuTUBE,
(Apr. 8, 2014) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNOjxdBJSJ4 (last visited
Sept. 18, 2016).
91 Introducing Inception Technologies Infinitime 7.08, INCEPTION TECHNOLOGIES,
http://www.inceptiontechnologies.com/pdf/IT-708 SS rl.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YN4F-8H2R] (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) ("InfiniTime can be
configured to allow employees view-only access to their web timecard so that
they can see their hours for the pay period."); BIGTIME, Expenses, supra note
75 ("once a user submits their time, they can't edit it anymore. Submitting a
timesheet is just like handing in a paper timesheet, and once a user submits
their timesheet, it's not theirs to work with anymore. It's now available for
administrators and managers to review and edit."); Rich K, supra note 59
(explaining that the system is confirmed so the employee cannot make edits to
their own card, but suggesting that the system could be configured in different
ways).
92 Maurice E. Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39
J. CORP. L. 769, 807 (2014) ("An emerging field, behavioral ethics, uses insights
from psychology to better understand how people actually behave when
confronted with ethical dilemmas").
93 Lisa Shu, Francesca Gino & Max Bazerman, Ethical Discrepancy: Changing
Our Attitudes to Resolve Moral Dissonance in BEHAVIORAL BUSINESS ETHICS
221 (De Cramer & Tenbrunsel eds., 2012) ("Several studies have found that
people lie and cheat on a daily basis and much more often than they dare to
admit .... [W]hen given the opportunity to act dishonestly, a surprisingly large
number of individuals do cross ethical boundaries"); Ariely, supra note 84 at
195-97 (describing two types of dishonesty-the robbing a bank type of
dishonest, and "the kind committed by people who generally consider
themselves honest-the men and women ... who have 'borrowed' a pen from a
conference site, taken an extra splash of soda from the soft drink dispenser,
exaggerated the cost of their television on their property loss report, or falsely
reported a meal with Aunt Enid as a business expense"); Rachel Barkan et al.,
The Pot Calling the Kettle Black: Distancing Response to Ethical Dissonance,
J. ExP. PSYCHO. GEN. 757, 757 (2012) ("research suggests hat people lie and
cheat much more often than they care to admit").
26
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First, cheating depends on opportunity - it will be more
prevalent where the situation allows individuals to fudge the
results in their favor than where no such discretion is provided.94
When such opportunities present themselves, cheating is
surprisingly prevalent. For example, in a study where business
school students self-reported correct answers on a test, and had
a very small financial incentive to inflate their correct answers
(ten cents per answer), the majority of the study subjects inflated
their answers, by an average of four answers.9 5 In addition,
people are more likely to steal when the item stolen is in units
other than cash-such as food in a communal fridge, or poker
chips.96 They are also more likely to cheat where they have other
ways to distance themselves from the transaction-such as
giving a questionable expense reimbursement to an
administrative assistant to submit, rather than submitting it
themselves.9 7 Prevalence of cheating flows from the extent to
which individuals can rationalize the dishonest conduct and
maintain their identity as honest people.98 Of particular
relevance for our context, behavioral economist Dan Ariely
observes that "electronic transactions, with no physical
exchange of money from hand to hand, might make it easier for
people to be dishonest-without ever questioning or fully
acknowledging the immorality of their actions."99
Cheating is also more prevalent where others are observed
engaging in dishonest conduct.100 This is especially true if
94 Many of Dan Ariely's experiments consist of situations where students are
given a quiz of some sort, and then instructed to hand their answers in, or
grade the answers themselves and shred the original. He then estimates the
difference in number of correct answers between the groups with and without
an opportunity to cheat. Ariely, supra note 84, at 200-220. See also Shaul
Shalvi et al., Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies
ethical perceptions and behavior, 115 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HuMAN
DECISION PROCESSES 181 (2011) (opportunities to cheat based on rolling dice
visible only to the experiment participant).
95 Id. at 199-201.
96 Id. at 217-218.
97 Id. at 224.
98 Id. at 222. See also Yuval Feldman, Behavioral Ethics Meets Behavioral Law
and Economics in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 222 (2014) (research findings "indicate that people cheat only to the extent
that they can maintain their self-concept of being honest"). Indeed, those
engaged in unethical conduct may do so without even fully realizing the ethical
dimension or consequences of their decision. See David De Cremer, On The
Psychology of Preventing and Dealing with Ethical Failures: A Behavioral
Ethics Approach in MANAGERIAL ETHICS 112 (Marshall Schminke ed.,
2010).
99 Id. at 226.
100 See Cass Sunstein, SIMPLER 65-68 (2013) ("most of us are affected by the beliefs
and actions of others. With respect to obesity, proper exercise, alcohol
consumption, smoking, being vaccinated, and much more, the perceived
27
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employees are receiving mixed messages about company
values-for example, a formal policy prohibiting certain conduct,
where other policies, practices, and company culture undermine
that policy.101 The "other people" that influence behavior may
also be software designers who structure software to permit
cheating, which legitimizes noncompliance by sending the
implicit message that others are engaged in similar conduct.
As Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein argue from the
behavioral economics perspective, default settings have a strong
influence on behavior. 102 Thus, the default choices that software
programs design into systems' architecture will strongly
influence how that software is ultimately used.103 In this respect,
as Lawrence Lessig has observed, "code is law."104 Computer
decisions of others can have a big influence on individual behavior and
choice."); Robert Cialdini, The Triple Tumor Structure of Organizational
Dishonesty in CODES OF CONDUCT 48 (1996) ("People frequently decide what is
appropriate to think, feel and do in a situation by examining what others like
them are thinking, feeling and doing"); Robert Cialdini, Raymond Reno, Carl
Kallgren, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of
Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCH. 1015 (1990) (research subjects more likely to litter in litter-filled areas,
and when they observe others littering); Francesca Gino, Shahar Ayal & Dan
Ariely, Contagion and Differentiation in Unethical Behavior, 20
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 393 (2009) (research subjects more likely to cheat
when person on their team observed cheating); Stucke, supra note 92 at 813-
814.
101 Feldman, supra note 11, at 222 ("people cheat only to the extent that they can
maintain their self-concept of being honest"); Stucke, supra note 92 at 806
(describing how mixed messages at General Electric-imposing ambitious
growth goals while also prohibiting antitrust violations-ultimately produced
non-compliance). See also Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message:
Communicating Compliance Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 961-962 (2012) (research by behavioral scientists
suggests that organizations need to "acknowledge, and harness, powerful
drivers of ethical behavior that, while not usually thought of as
communications channels, nevertheless send unmistakable messages which
employees internalize and act upon.")
102 RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008) at 85-89; see also Cass
Sunstein, THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE 26 (2016) ("Default rules are probably the
most obvious and important nudges."); SIMPLER, supra note 100, at 58-59
(2013).
103 Sunstein also argues that defaults have a normative effect on behavior
beyond inertia or procrastination: "If your employer automatically enrolls you
in a savings plan, or if your state automatically presumes that people consent
to organ donation, you might think that most people, or most informed
people, believe that these are the right courses of action[.]" SIMPLER, supra
note 100, at 111.
104 Lawrence Lessig, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999); R. Polk
Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 457, 460 (2005) ("the
regulatory nature of technology is a point not at all confined to cyberspace");
James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L. J. 1719, 1729
("[S]oftware also limits behavior. By giving its users a set of possible actions,
it excludes every action not within this set.").
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code, perhaps more than legal code, determines the bounds of
permissible and prohibited behavior. Where default software
options tacitly permit or encourage cheating,105 behavioral
compliance, ethics, and economics predict that those settings
will encourage cheating to a much larger extent than if the
default settings were different. 106
Thus, theory suggests that Category A software is much
more likely to result in wage theft by supervisors than Category
B software or a paper system. First, to state the obvious,
supervisors cannot use problematic software features if those
features are absent from the software. Second, supervisors may
defer to the authority10 7 of Category A software makers and
assume that software makers would not include any
functionality that is legally problematic.
Third, Category A software makes cheating much easier, 108
and much more removed from the idea of wage "theft" than other
ways to accomplish the same result. Supervisors can, of course,
force their employees to work "off the clock" without the use of
software. For example, a supervisor could instruct an employee
to clock in after starting work or clock out before finishing work.
In that case, the practice would at least be known to the
employee. Indeed, such allegations are not uncommon in wage
and hour suits.109 However, doing so requires a much more overt
act on the part of the supervisor. The supervisor's identity as an
honest person becomes subject to challenge when she tells a
subordinate to work off the clock, not only in her own mind but
by a subordinate who objects to the instruction. In contrast,
105 Wu, supra note 82 at 682 ("The code designer... redesigns behavior for legal
advantage... Code design, as a means of avoiding laws, serves as a particularly
useful device for exploiting the internal dynamics of regulated groups.")
106 In The Ethics of Influence, Cass Sunstein offers a menu of different types of
choice architecture or "nudges" that can influence behavior, including default
rules, "disclosure ... simplification . . . warnings..reminders . .. increases in
ease and convenience ... personalization ... framing and timing ...
increases in salience . . . [and] use of social norms," among others. THE ETHICS
OF INFLUENCE, supra note 102, at 26.
107 Milgram, Stanley, Behavioral Study of obedience, 67 J. OF ABNORMAL &
SOCIAL PSYCH. 371 (1963).
108 THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE, supra note 102, at 21 ("Some nudges work
because... they make certain choices easier; people often choose the path of
least resistance.").
109 See, e.g., McGlone v. Contract Callers, Inc., 49 F. Supp. 3d 364, 366 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (employees alleged they were required to record exactly 40 hours of work
each week on timesheets, regardless of time actually worked); Monroe v. FTS
USA, LLC, 763 F. Supp. 2d 979, 984 (W.D. Tenn. 2011) (plaintiff alleged that
supervisors directed employees not to record time spent working); Lyles v.
Burt's Butcher Shoppe & Eatery, Inc., No. 4:10-CV-53, 2011 WL 4915484 at *2
(M.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2011) (alleging that employer "instructed Plaintiff to clock
in and out so as to not exceed forty hours of Clock Time").
29
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Category B software is designed to require just such a
confrontation, forcing the supervisor to instruct employees to
make edits to their own timesheets, which (if the edits are
unlawful) similarly threatens the supervisor's identity as an
honest person. Even a paper system requires more active
participation on the part of the supervisor, by forcing her to
physically cross out reported time and overwrite it with a
different number. A supervisor engaging in such conduct is
likely to have more conscious awareness that she is altering the
records in a questionable way.110
Further, Category A software makes wage edits more
tempting and more likely because the information appears in the
software as hours, not dollars. Although supervisors' edits may
have the effect of reducing an employee's paycheck, their
alterations are not denominated in dollars, but in hours
subsequently converted to dollars. A cursor-based editing
system, where the supervisor believes he or she is deleting and
replacing the existing number (regardless of whether the data is
preserved in the underlying software), removes the
uncomfortable reminder of the original hours submitted by the
employee. A slider for adjusting an employee's working hours
feels even more removed from stealing, and may even be
experienced by the user as visually "lining up" an employee's
hours worked with an even number of hours, or a scheduled
shift.
Moreover, the terminology used by software makers for
employer modification of hours worked tends to legitimize
illegitimate reductions in workers' time. Several Category A
programs use the word "edit" to refer to supervisor
modifications. See Appendix, Figures 1-2. The use of the word
"edit," as opposed to a narrower word, such as "correct," suggests
that such functionality can be used for broader purposes than
simply correcting a mistake or filling in missing information. In
110 Notably, however, the identity of the workers whose hours are being altered
may influence the supervisor's self-conception. As one of us has argued
elsewhere, employers may view low-wage immigrant workers' rights on the
job differently from U.S. workers, as employers may have adopted what
scholars have called a "dual frame of reference," in which the employer views
him or herself as the charitable provider of a job to a worker whose
alternative employment options in his or her country of origin are extremely
limited. Therefore, even an employer who knowingly engages in wage theft
from immigrant workers in the United States can maintain a self perception
as honest, or even benevolent, because even sub-minimum wages in the
United States are presumably higher than subsistence wages in the worker's
country of origin. Put another way, the low-wage immigrant worker's power
within the transnational abor market may be insufficient to trigger feelings
of dishonesty or guilt in a law-breaking U.S. employer. Charlotte Alexander,
Explaining Peripheral Labor: A Poultry Industry Case Study, 33 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 353 (2012).
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one software demonstration, the narrator illustrates the "edit"
feature as a way to fill in missing time when an employee forgets
to punch. Of course, if the purpose were limited to filling in
missing time, the software could be designed so as to permit
edits only when information is missing.
B. Computational Shortcuts to Cheating: Reconcile
Functionality
Another feature of Category A software is "reconcile"
functionality, through which the software flags certain types of
time entry for additional scrutiny. See Appendix, Figure 8. This
functionality has also been described as "managing by
exception,"111 and is pitched as an efficiency tool allowing
supervisors to triage which types of time punches merit further
review and which ones can be approved automatically.1 12 This,
too, is not unlawful per se, and could be used for legitimate
purposes. A supervisor might have a legitimate interest in
reviewing overtime worked in order to assess staffing needs,
identify unauthorized overtime, and make budget adjustments,
for example.
Software makers pitch "reconcile" functionality as a way to
make supervisors aware of time entry issues-a way to "spot
trends quickly, and proactively address attendance issues."113
For example, Kronos pitches "management by exception" as a
way to "find and correct missed punches, respond to time-off
requests, and flag and approve overtime."114 However, if the
reconcile feature were merely informational in nature, it would
be structured and characterized as a "report," not embedded into
1 ADP, ADP Workforce Now Essential Time 1,
https://www.adp.com/-/media/Workforce%20Now/pdf/ADP-WorkforceNow-
Essential-Time-Fact-Sheet.ashx [https://perma.cc/XGS6-6L9D] (last visited
Sept. 18, 2016).
112 Id.; see also, OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER, PAYROLL Div., Reconciling and
Approving Timecards, CITY & CTY. OF DENVER (July 10, 2016, 11:20 PM),
www.denvergov.org/portals/679/documents/managertoolbox/kronos/quickrefer
ences/mgr-quickref reconciling-and approving timecards.pdf; Stanford
University Information Technology and Services, Reconcile Timecard Genie,
STANFORD UNIV., INFO. TECH. & SERVS. (July 10, 2016, 11:32 PM),
web. stanford. edu/dept/itss/proj ects/kronos 5/tutorials/employee timecards/ree
oncile timecards.html [https://perma.cc/S5QU-BB6M]; Managers ADP eTime
Training Manual ROGER WILLIAMS UNIv. (Aug. 2014),
http://www.rwu.edu/sites/default/files/downloads/finance/payroll/managers-a
dp-etime training manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/AK9E-32WP] (last visited
Sept. 18, 2016) (illustrating functionality of reviewing exceptions).
113 ADP, supra note 111 at 1.
114 Kronos, supra note 60. See also Roger Williams University, supra note 112
(reconciling functionality used for identifying unauthorized absences, missed
punches, or to review comments on a timesheet).
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the functionality for reviewing and approving (or rejecting, or
modifying) employee time. Indeed, Category B software makes
similar information available, but does so in the form of a report
for review.
Just as the use of the word "edit" suggests that supervisors
can and should modify time for purposes other than corrections,
the use of the word "reconcile" or "manage" legitimizes wage
edits.115 Dictionary definitions of the term "reconcile" - "to make
consistent or congruous" and "to check (a financial account)
against another for accuracy"116 - suggest hat one form of input
will be modified to conform to another. Presumably, the raw data
will be modified to conform to the supervisor's preferences
regarding the number of hours that "should have" been worked,
rather than those actually worked.
Indeed, some embedded functionality suggests that
reconciling can serve to undermine substantive wage and hour
rules. For example, "reconciling" functionality can flag "early in"
punches or "late out" punches,117 which impose additional costs
on the company and which managers have an incentive to edit
to meet budget.118 (See Appendix, Figure 8.) "Reconcile" flagging
can also identify any overtime for review by a supervisor.119 One
video showed reconciling used to scrutinize overtime, which
provided supervisors with the option to approve "all," "some," or
"none" of the overtime worked.120 (See Appendix, Figure 9.) As
115 NUDGE, supra note 102 at 21 ("Some nudges work because of social
influences. If you are told what other people do, you might do it too, because
you think it's probably a good idea to do what they do... A default rule might
be effective for just that reason; it has the power of suggestion."); On Amir &
Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs
Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2121-22 (2008) ("the frame in
which information is presented both responds to and constructs ocial norms.
Preferences are endogenously shaped by the framing and setting of defaults .
. . defaults themselves are norm generating.").
116 Reconcile, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/reconcile [https://perma.ce/C78R-EZ3Y] (last visited
July 10, 2016).
117 Kronos, supra note 66 at 17 (advising employers to select software that "allow
managers to see which employees are approaching overtime or are absent at
the start of their shifts, so the managers can react immediately to correct the
situation"); CITY & CTY. OF DENVER, PAYROLL Div., OFFICE OF THE
CONTROLLER, supra note 112, at 1.
118 See Carr6 & Tilly, supra note 79 (discussing supervisor pressure to avoid
overtime).
119 WorkForcelQ, Reconcile Flagging Notification Settings, YOUTUBE, (May 13,
2012) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xzVw f-Q6Lw.
120 Rich K, supra note 59. Compare narration in Scott Campbell, Kronos
Timekeeper Training for Managers and Approvers (July 19, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watchv=4HmN1Q0Iq5Y (last visited September 25,
2016) ("all overtime in the Kronos system will automatically be assigned to a
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previously noted, an employee who works unapproved overtime
may be disciplined by an employer, but the lack of approval does
not render those hours uncompensable. Although the default
selection for the pop-up window is to pay "all" overtime hours,
the presence of the other options suggest that paying employees
for overtime is "optional." In addition, social science research
suggests that "some" will be an attractive option because it
represents an intermediate choice between "all" and "none." The
well-documented "compromise effect" finds a consistent bias in
favor of the intermediate option where three options are
presented.12 1 Thus, supervisors are likely to choose the "some"
option even if they have no intention to cheat.
Another program offers a reconcile option that enables
supervisors to "carry forward" hours worked from one pay period
to another. 122 (See Appendix, Figure 10.) The most obvious use
for such a feature would be to move employee time from a week
in which the employee worked overtime to a week in which the
employee did not, to avoid paying the overtime premium. We are
hard pressed to identify any situation in which carrying forward
hours would be compliant with wage and hour law.123 In the
audio that accompanies a training video on this software, the
narrator explains that the functionality is intended to facilitate
the payment of additional compensation to the employee by
moving the hours to a pay period in which the employee is
eligible for double time: "Carry forward hours is used to have
excess time from one pay period forwarded on to another pay
period. This is normally done in replacement of overtime with
double time."12 4 However, the functionality visible from the video
code called 'unapproved overtime.' In order for the student to be paid for that
time, the manager must use the transfer protocol we just saw to transfer that
time from unapproved overtime from to approved overtime.").
121 See, e.g., Ravi Dhar, Stephen Nowlis, & Steven Sherman, Trying Hard or
Hardly Trying: An Analysis of Context Effects in Choice, 9 J. CONSUMER PSYCH.
189 (2000); Itamar Simonsson, Choice Based on Reasons: the Case of Attraction
and Compromise Effects, 16 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 158 (1989); Itamar
Simonsson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and
Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. OF MARKETING RESEARCH, 281 (1992) ("the
attractiveness of an option is enhanced if it is an intermediate option in the
choice set and is diminished if it is an extreme option").
122 WorkforcelQ, Carry Forward Hours, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watchv=J5VfillCLk (Mar. 13 2012).
123 Carry forward hours could in theory be permissible for purposes of calculating
compensatory time off to employees exempt from overtime - extra time off for
working additional hours. Simmons, supra note 45 at 289. Compensatory time
off is not permissible under the FLSA for non-exempt employees. Id. The "comp
time" justification is somewhat questionable in two respects. First, employers
do not typically track hours for exempt employees. Second, a strict comp time
system for exempt employees can undermine their exempt status by calling
into question whether they are truly paid on a salary basis. Id.
124 WorkforcelQ, supra note 122.
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does not suggest that the feature is limited to "carry forward"
situations that are favorable to the employee. As Figure 10
(Appendix) shows, the plain text description of the feature
provides that "you can take excess hours that an employee works
in one Pay Period and apply them to future Pay Periods."1 25
Perhaps acknowledging the questionable legality of this feature,
the program advises users to "consult an advisor for all legal
restrictions in your area" before proceeding.126
Like the time card edit functionality, "reconcile" features
present situational cues that facilitate cheating. "Reconciling"
makes it cognitively easier to cheat because the questionable
functionality is presented as a legitimate supervisor task rather
than a form of dishonesty. Reconcile features also make cheating
more efficient. A supervisor wishing to shave overtime in paper
records would need to scour the records, add up hours to identify
the overtime hours, and then physically modify hours associated
with overtime before they are sent to payroll. By contrast,
Category A software does all of the work of identifying overtime
hours (or any other type of hours the supervisor wants to
scrutinize), enabling the supervisor to modify the exact entries
associated with the overtime hours without further effort. Even
Category B software demands more effort on the supervisor's
part-while the "report" functionality could identify overtime
hours, the supervisor would need to then "reject" the hours
worked and co-ordinate with the affected employee to resubmit
a lower number of hours. Behavioral compliance theory would
predict that Category B software would result in less cheating,
simply because the cheating process requires more effort and the
architecture presents fewer opportunities to rationalize away
the conduct.
C. Automated Defaults Dominate Manual Overrides:
Automatic Break Deductions
Category A software also allows the employer to act like a
software designer, in that employers may set up "rules" for how
time is handled.127 In particular, software can enable the
employer to specify break "rules" that automatically deduct meal
or rest breaks from the employee's hours. (See Figures 11128 &
12129, Appendix.)
125 Id., Figure 10 (Appendix).
126 Id., Figure 10 (Appendix).
127 Lawrence Lessig's phrase "code is law" refers to software's role in
"constrain [ing] behavior." Grimmelman supra note 104 at 1719 (note) (2005);
Lessig, supra note 104.
128 WorkForcelQ, supra note 119.
129 ShiftPlanning, ShiftPlanning Tutorial - Lunch and Break Times, YOUTUBE,
(Jan. 12, 2012) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrP18QZYG8.
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For example, one YouTube video provides the following
example of an automated break rule:
Non-paid breaks will be deducted from
the total number of hours an employee
works. For example, if you have an
employee scheduled to work 8AM to 5PM
Monday to Friday that's actually 45
hours of scheduled time. Using the above
break rules however, we know that this
employee isn't actually working 45 hours.
And both their overtime and reports will
show the adjusted 40 hours of work. 130
Where state wage and hour law permits a meal or rest
break to be unpaid, there is nothing unlawful per se about
automatically deducting such unpaid periods from an employee's
paycheck. Suppose, however, that the employer structures the
software break rules in a manner that does not comply with
state wage and hour rules-for example, deducting ten minutes
for each of two rest breaks where state law requires that such
rest breaks be paid. Once adopted, that rule will be implemented
for each paycheck for whatever class of employees is designated
by the employer-for example, all non-exempt employees
nationwide.
To the extent that individual employees have access to
their electronic timecards, break deductions may not be visible,
and may not even be visible as an edit. Likewise, even where
edits to individual timecards are visible to an individual
employee, only the employer knows which class of employees are
subject to the deduction rule and how long deductions have been
occurring.131 A plaintiffs lawyer who learns of an individual
employee's unlawful deductions may have to guess about
whether the deduction was sufficiently widespread to support
the costs of pursuing a class or collective action.
Software also facilitates cheating based on design
decisions-and user decisions-about which types of actions will
be automated and which will be manual. Automated actions
function like a default setting. Functionality that is automated
is the default result, unless that result is manually overridden.
130 Id.
131 Grimmelmann, supra note 104 at 1736 ("[s]oftware is asymmetric. The
programmer can determine its responses, but the users sees only the results of
the software's individual decisions-allow this action, forbid that one-and lacks
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Where the manual override is difficult to implement, the force of
the automated choice becomes especially strong. Suppose, for
example, that an employer structures its break rules to
automatically deduct an unpaid thirty-minute meal period from
an employee's time entry but the employee worked through the
meal period. Overriding the automatic deduction requires some
additional action on the part of the individual employee and/or
supervisor. If the software is not configured to permit the
employee to modify his or her own timecard,132 the employee
may need to alert the supervisor to modify the timesheet on his
or her behalf. Or perhaps the employer instructs the employee
to enter a note into a physical log book to indicate a missed meal
period, which the employer then enters into the software at a
later date.133 Because the system defaults to deducting the break
from the meal period, any omission or gap in the override
system-whether the employee's failure to note the missed
break, or the supervisor's failure to enter it into the system-
favors the employer over the employee. The aggregate effect of
the default break rule is equivalent to a form of wage-shaving. 134
Software makers pitch automatic break rules as a
necessary time-saver for employers previously burdened with
entering breaks manually. This represents somewhat of a
sleight of hand for both software makers and the employers that
use their system. Both know that the sophisticated login
functionality within the software - pitched as anti-fraud
protection against employees' attempts to log more hours than
they have worked - could track breaks more accurately than the
automatic rules. For example, employees working with call
center software are automatically logged in and out of the
timekeeping system when they open and close the call center
software.135 Other software allows employees to log in and out
with their cell phone or with a swipe of their ID card.136 There
132 For example, Kronos can be set up to preclude employees from modifying their
own timesheets. Rich K, supra note 59.
133 Berger v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, supra note 54.
134 As with the employer edits discussed above, phantom break deductions can
violate both the overtime and minimum wage provisions of the FLSA, causing
workers' recorded hours to dip below forty when they should have triggered the
overtime requirement, and/or bringing workers' effective hourly wage below
the required minimum.
135 Waine-Golston v. Time Warner Entertainment, No. 11-CV-1057, 2013 WL
1285535 *3 (S.D. Cal. March 27, 2013).
136 See supra note 2; see also; Hamadou v. Hess Corp, 915 F. Supp. 2d 651, 655
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("employees log into a computer at the Hess station to 'clock-
in' and 'clock-out' at the beginning and end of their shifts"); Rogers v. Brauer
Law Offices, PLC, No. CV-10-1693, 2012 WL 426725 (D. Ariz. Feb. 10, 2012)
(records based on "clocking in and out of BLO's telephone system"); Arencibia
v. 2401 Rest. Corp., 831 F. Supp. 2d 164, 172 (D.D.C. 2011) ("employees clock
in and out each day using a computer system called Micros."); Dominguez v.
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are many low cost behavioral tracking systems that enable more
accurate methods. Employers do not maintain automatic break
rules to save time; notions of efficiency rationalize a system that
weighs in the employer's favor.
Even where employers use an employee's raw time card
data to calculate breaks, at least one software maker offers an
automated overlay that reclaims the break for the employer. As
illustrated in Figure 12 (Appendix), the software "auto-adds" a
break where the system indicates that the employee did not
clock out for a break ("when a person works the Required Shift
Length, but does not punch in or out for this break, the system
will automatically add this break.") It is of course possible that
an employee took a break but failed to clock out to reflect that
break. Software makers might also defend the the "auto-add"
functionality based on a California rule requiring that employers
in that state provide an "opportunity" for a break.137 Where the
employee was provided such opportunity and did not take it, the
"auto-add" functionality may be defensible, depending on the
circumstances. Nevertheless, the same software functionality
could be used to avoid wage and hour law - such as an employer
that routinely deprived employees of an opportunity for a break
and nevertheless deducts those breaks from employees' wages.
D. Statistical Cheating: Rounding Rules
Timekeeping software also enables a kind of statistical
cheating, in the form of "rounding" rules, which round workers'
hours up or down to a pre-set point. A common unit of rounding
appears to be seven minutes.138 Time punches up to seven
Quigley's Ir. Pub, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 803, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2011) ("servers are
required to clock-in and clock-out on the computer system using their
individual employee number"); Berger v. The Cleveland Clinic Found., supra
note 54 at *3 (employee "record[ed] the time he worked by swiping his
electronic badge in an electronic reader at the start and end of his shift");
TSheets, "Mobile Time Tracking: What Time Clock App is Right for Your
Business?" https://www.tsheets.com/mobile-time-tracking
[https://perma.cc/23Y8-AYXQ] (describing "iPhone Time Tracking App":
"[w]ith the simple touch of a button and easy-to-use graphical interface,
employees can easily clock in, clock out, take a break... -all in real time").
137 Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1040 (2012).
138 KRONOS Grace Periods and Rounding, UNIV. OF MIAMI (July 10, 2016, 11:51
PM),
https://umshare.miami. edu/web/wda/payroll/ElectronicTimekeeping/kronos-g
race periods and rounding.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHD5-99D2]; Payroll &
Employee Benefits: Understanding the Kronos Punch Rounding Rule, BALL
STATE UNIVERSITY (DEC. 12, 2017, 9:51 AM) https://cms.bsu.edu/-
/media/www/departmentalcontent/payroll/pdfs/kronos%20rounding%20rules.
pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/2GRL-FTY3]; Rounding Procedures, VANDERBILT
UNIV. (July 10, 2016, 11:55 PM),
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minutes prior to or after the hour are treated as having been
entered exactly on the hour.139 Consequently, the rounded
punches ultimately used to calculate payroll will always be in
fifteen minute increments.140
The federal DOL regulations authorizing rounding date back
to 1961, and have not been amended since then. 141 At that time,
rounding rules represented a practical allowance from a pre-
digital era, where computing time sheets by hand, by the
minute, would have been extremely burdensome. No such
efficiency-based justification exists for incorporating rounding
into timekeeping software, which can both track and compute
time at the millisecond level, automatically.
Nevertheless, rounding remains a key feature in
timekeeping software because it can be used to favor the
employer's interests over the employee's, in the aggregate. While
courts do not permit overtly unfair rounding rules, facially
neutral rounding rules can act like casino odds when they
interact with employer attendance policies - consistently
favoring "the house." Suppose for example, that the employer
adopts a rounding rule where time is rounded to the nearest
seven minutes-a login five minutes before or after the hour is
treated as a login exactly on the hour (e.g. arrival for a shift at
8:55 or 9:05 is treated as a login at 9:00). Likewise, a logout five
minutes before or after the hour is treated as a logout exactly on
the hour (departure at 4:55 or 5:05 is treated as a logout at 5:00).
This system is facially neutral. If there were a symmetrical
distribution of logins and logouts before and after the hour, the
net effect would not favor or disfavor the employer, consistent
with the requirements of the DOL's rounding regulations.
However, some employers expect that logins and logouts are
not symmetrical, primarily owing to their promulgated
attendance policies. Under typical employer policies, employees
must be at their workstation and ready to work at the start of
their shift. Arriving or logging in late violates the attendance
policy, regardless of how that time is treated under timekeeping
"rounding rules." Leaving before the end of a scheduled shift also
violates attendance policies. Indeed, employers tend to state so





141 Compare 26 F.R. 195 (Jan. 11, 1961) with identical language in 29 C.F.R. §
785.48 (2016). The actual practice of rounding dates back even further, as the
regulations refer to practices in place "for many years." 29 C.F.R. § 785.48.
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you clock in up to 7 minutes after your scheduled start time, your
paid time will round to your scheduled start time. You may still
receive an occurrence for tardiness."142 The manual continues,
"Reminder: Each employee is expected to report to work at their
scheduled time. Arriving late or leaving early may be addressed
through the Attendance and Punctuality Policy." 1 43 Another
instructional document warns, "An employee whose schedule
requires him/her to be at work at 8.30AM and who clocks in after
that scheduled time, is considered late regardless of the fact that
the system calculate[s] hours worked for that day as if they
actually clocked in at 8.30 AM... Supervisors should take
disciplinary action based on actual clock in/out times
displayed in the system."14 4
When such policies are in place, employees are likely to
consistently arrive at work a few minutes early so that they are
ready for work at their shift's start time. If they log in a few
minutes early, however, and perform compensable work for that
time, the minutes before the hour will be rounded away.
Likewise, employees who are discouraged from leaving early will
depart on or after the hour, and that time will also be rounded
away. For employees scheduled for an eight-hour day, this
disappearing time also likely qualifies as overtime, which they
will not receive. What appears as a neutral rounding rule thus
favors "the house." This fact is not lost on employers. Examples
provided in some instructional materials have the cumulative
effect of undercompensating employees for hours worked.1 45 For
example, the rounding depicted in Figure 14 (Appendix), taken
from an employer's instruction manual, has the cumulative
effect of subtracting forty-three minutes from the collective
paychecks of the employees depicted. 146 When aggregated across
many more employees over many pay periods, considerable
cumulative wages are unpaid.
As discussed further in the next section, rounding also
exploits the information asymmetry between employer and
employee. Employees may not know that their timesheet is
rounded. They may or may not have access to their raw time and
142 VANDERBILT UNIV., supra note 138.
143 Id.
144 UNIV. OF MIAMI, supra note 138.
145 VANDERBILT UNIV., supra note 138.
146 See Figure 14. In Example 1, the employee worked 3 hours and 6 minutes,
which was rounded down to 3 hours (loss of 6 minutes). In Example 2, the
employee worked 2 hours and 12 minutes, which was rounded down to 2
hours (loss of 12 minutes). In Example 3, the employee worked 3 hours and
11 minutes, which was rounded down to 3 hours (loss of 11 minutes). In
Example 4, the employee worked 3 hours and 14 minutes, which was rounded
down to 3 hours (loss of 14 minutes). The cumulative effect of the rounding in
the employer's example was a loss of 43 minutes.
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attendance data, and so would not be in a position to identify the
cumulative effect of the rounding policy on their paycheck. By
contrast, employers have access to the raw data, and can model
the cumulative effect of rounding versus not rounding. It seems
unlikely that employers would ever choose to implement a
rounding policy if it had the cumulative effect of
overcompensating employees. To revisit the casino analogy,
employers likely structure the rules to favor house odds. In
theory, employees could challenge their systematic wage loss; a
rounding practice that "result[s], over a period of time, in failure
to compensate the employees properly for all the time they have
actually worked" does not comply with existing DOL rules.147
However, the only party knowledgeable as to the cumulative
effect of the rounding practice is the employer.
E. Software Architecture that Inhibits Enforcement:
Data Encoding
Thus far, we have examined software features that
undermine wage and hour law by tempting users to cheat.
However, software can also undermine regulatory systems by
interfering with the enforcement structures for those laws. In
particular, software architecture that obscures data critical to
enforcement separately undermines regulatory systems.
Three sets of actors have a role in wage and hour law
enforcement: (i) workers, their lawyers, and expert witnesses
hired for litigation; (ii) employers, their lawyers, and their own
advisors and expert witnesses; and (iii) federal and state
enforcement agencies. When timekeeping software lacks
transparency as to whether and how workers' hours have been
edited, each actor is hindered in its ability to play its
enforcement role. Employees and associated parties have an
interest in knowing the basis on which their pay is calculated
and detecting, quantifying, and proving underpayment if it
occurs. Management should be able to ensure that lower level
supervisors are editing workers' hours in compliance with wage
and hour law. The DOL and its state agency equivalents should
be able to trace the occurrence and reason for edits to workers'
time in audits or enforcement actions.
The way that data is encoded and organized has a
substantial effect on whether parties other than the employer
will be able to detect a wage and hour violation, and estimate
the size of any such violation. In particular, it can be very
difficult to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate edits without
information about the reason for such edits. As illustrated in
147 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(b).
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Figure 7 (Appendix), some software programs prompt managers
to choose a reason when changing an employee's time. In the
absence of such a prompt, however, employees, employers and
outside auditors and reviewers can only guess at why workers'
hours were altered.
Suppose, for example, that the employer has preserved
records of timecard edits, and an expert witness in the ensuing
litigation finds several thousand instances of supervisor edits.1 4 8
Suppose also that, on average, the employer added 10 minutes
of time to the employee's time card over these thousands of edits.
See Figure 3, below. This undifferentiated analysis suggests
that the employees have not been adversely affected by wage
edits.
Figure 3: Histogram of Employer Edits to Employee
Timecardsl 49
-20 -10 0 10 20
hrs added or subtracted bc of time punch edits
However, it is possible that an analysis that disaggregates
the edits by "reason for edits" would reveal a different picture.
For example, edits that were non-discretionary - such as
correcting missed punches - may have had the net effect of
adding time to employee timecards. By contrast, discretionary
edits with more questionable justifications may have had the net
effect of reducing employee time worked, and therefore reducing
earned compensation. See Figure 4, below.
148 This example is reproduced consistent with copyright terms from Zev Eigen,
A Proposal to Improve Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 66TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR 57-59, LexisNexis (2014).
149 This Figure was originally published in Eigen, supra note 148.
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Figure 4: Histograms of Employer





hrs added or subtracted bc of time punch edits
Graphs by class
The disaggregated results would not be detectable by an
outside expert where the software does not prompt the
supervisor to document the basis for edits. To be sure, it would
seem unlikely that an employer would provide a documented
reason consisting of "reducing overtime" - though the "comment"
options available in Figure 7 (Appendix) suggest just that.
Regardless, some information is better than no information, and
supervisors making unlawful discretionary edits may have a
propensity for using certain coded explanations in that case.
Requiring documentation of the reasons for an edit would also
serve the additional function of discouraging supervisors from
making deductions without adequate justification.
Timekeeping software's lack of transparency hinders
experts', the DOL's, and state agencies' ability to perform their
functions in another way as well. Raw data is often maintained
in a proprietary format that is unique to each particular
software program. As Eigen has previously argued, this presents
several challenges.15 1 Although time and date data might be
legible in "native format,"152 when viewed within the confines of
This Figure was originally published in Eigen, supra note 148.
Id. at 53-56.
"Native format" refers to the "default format of a file . . . typically provided
through the software program on which it was created or through which it was









Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 19 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol19/iss1/1
THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 19
the proprietary software itself, it can become indecipherable
once exported to a different software program for analysis. Dates
and times are unusual types of data because they do not use the
base ten decimal number system. Nevertheless, many software
programs do encode times and dates as base ten numbers,
converting 9:00:00 am EST on December 12, 2013 into the
number 1386860400, for example.153 The software does so by
storing the date and time as the number of seconds that have
elapsed since some arbitrary date in the past, known as the
"epoch date." For example, Unix-based software encodes time
and date information as the number of seconds elapsed since the
date January 1, 1970.154 Yet not all software programs use the
same epoch date; Microsoft Excel uses midnight on January 1,
1900.155 Thus, exporting raw time and attendance data from the
proprietary program into statistical software for analysis, or
even into widely used Microsoft Excel, can prove quite difficult.
Much of the useful information is lost in the course of the file
conversion.
A second challenge is in deciphering the meaning of the data,
which may not provide any summary information explaining
how each variable is encoded.15 6 (See Figure 5, below). A dataset
may have two variables reflecting "timein" and "timeout." From
those variables, it may not be possible to decipher whether they
refer to working time or break time. There is likely some third
variable, e.g. "paycode" that identifies whether the timestamps
refer to breaks or time worked. But if the "paycode" variable
appears in the form of numbers, it is essentially impossible for
an outsider to identify what those variables mean from the
numbers alone.
153 Eigen, supra note 148 at 55-57 (using this example to illustrate the Epoch date
and base ten conversion problem). See Epoch Unix Time Stamp Converter,
DAN'S TOOLS (July 2, 2016, 9:34 PM), http://www.unixtimestamp.com and
Epoch & Unix Timestamp Conversion Tools, EPOCH CONVERTER, (July 2, 2016,
9:38 PM), http://www.epochconverter.com/ for more information about Unix's
time encoding system.
154 Eigen, supra note 148 at 55.
155 Id. at 56.
156 A variation of this example appears in Eigen, supra note 148 at 52-54.
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For the data to be meaningful, the data output would need
to include a codebook that explains each variable.15 8 For data
entries that are shorthand for categories (for example, paycode
"200"), the codebook would explain that paycode "200" refers to
break times. However, existing timekeeping software is typically
not structured to export such information. It is possible, for
example, that the employer typed "200" in the paycode field
directly in the software, and that documentation resides in the
employer's files somewhere. More likely, paycode "200" is
associated with "break times" within the software, but that
information is not exported along with the raw data. When this
problem is reproduced for every variable across millions of rows,
157 This Figure was originally published in Eigen, supra note 148.
158 A codebook is similar to, but distinct from "metadata," which is information
about the file that is automatically generated by the software (for example,
the file creation date). Metadata refers to "information about the document or
file that is recorded by the computer to assist the computer and often the user
in storing and retrieving the document or file at a later date... such
information includes file designation, create and edit dates, authorship,
comments and edit history." The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles:
Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic
Document Production, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 151, 155 (2004). While metadata
relates to information about an entire file, a codebook provides information
about individual variables. See How to Use a Codebook, PRINCETON
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
http://dss.princeton.edu/online help/analysis/codebook.htm
[https://perma.cc/A3W6-746Z] (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) ("A codebook is a
technical description of the data that was collected for a particular purpose.
It describes how the data are arranged in the computer file or files, what the
various numbers and letters mean, and any special instructions on how to
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the data becomes functionally unintelligible to even a
sophisticated expert in litigation.159
In summary, timekeeping software in Category A offers
several different types of functionality that undermine
substantive wage and hour laws-by making it practically and
ethically easy for supervisors to shave time, by enabling
employers to formulate software rules that systematically favor
the employer, and by making such malfeasance more difficult to
detect. However, software makers are not solely to blame for
software offerings that undermine law, nor are the employers
that select Category A over Category B software. As cyberlaw
scholars have argued, the relationship between law and software
is recursive.160 As we discuss in Part V below, the same software
that undermines legal rules is also an outgrowth of those rules.
V. THE INFLUENCE OF RECORDKEEPING RULES ON
SOFTWARE DESIGN
In one view, timekeeping software exists within a market-
driven ecosystem where employers demand ever more complex
(and questionable) features, and software makers compete to
provide them. However, the software market is also constrained
by legal rules about how employer time records are kept and
maintained. As we explain in greater detail below, Category A
software is made possible by DOL recordkeeping rules that place
very few constraints on how employers maintain records. The
Department of Defense contracting audit guidelines represent a
useful counterpoint to the DOL recordkeeping rules. Although
they do not impose formal rules, they specify types of
recordkeeping processes that the DOD considers suspicious,
which then encouraged the development of Category B software.
159 Eigen, supra note 148 at 53-54.
160 Wagner, supra note 104, at 461 ("lurking in the background of much recent
work that accepts as true the code-is-law proviso is the question of the
relationship: how, exactly, does regulation-by-software compare to regulation-
by-law, and how do the two interact?") Lessig also examined the recursive
relationship between code and law in Code. Lessig, supra note 104.
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A. Gaps in The FLSA's Recordkeeping Requirements
Section 211(c) of the FLSA requires an employer to "make,
keep, and preserve such records of the persons employed by him
and of the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of
employment maintained by him, and shall preserve such records
for such period of time, and shall make such reports therefrom
to the [Department of Labor]."161 The DOL, in turn, has issued
implementing regulations, which were last updated in 1987. The
regulations provide employers considerable latitude regarding
record keeping. They expressly permit employers to create and
retain records in any order or form.162 They mandate only that
the employer "maintain and preserve" certain types of
information, including: "hours worked each workday and total
hours worked each workweek... [and] total additions to or
deductions from wages paid each pay period including employee
purchase orders or wage assignments."163 The regulations also
require that employers "preserve" payroll records for three
years,164 and "basic time and earning cards or sheets on which
are entered the daily starting and stopping time of individual
employees" for two years.165 These records must be made
available for "inspection and transcription" by the DOL. 166
Employers must also provide "extension, recompilation, or
transcription" of the records to the DOL on request.167
Because the DOL recordkeeping regulations have not been
amended since 1987,168 they do not address the possibility that
employees' time and attendance records might be easily altered
and obscured via timekeeping software. Specifically, the
regulations fail to require a record of changes, with
explanations, to employees' raw timekeeping data and fail to
require that data be available in an accessible format.
Indeed, the regulations' text, which continues to refer to
employers' use of "microfilm" and "basic time and earnings
cards," suggests that regulators were not even considering the
possibility that records of employees' hours worked could or
161 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (2012).
162 29 C.F.R. § 516.1(a) (2016) (providing that "[n]o particular order or form of
records is prescribed.").
163 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a) (2016).
164 29 C.F.R. § 516.5(a) (2016).
165 29 C.F.R. § 516.6(a)(1) (2016).
166 29 C.F.R. § 516.7(b) (2016).
167 29 C.F.R. § 516.8 (2016).
168 See Fair Labor Standards Act; Records to be Kept by Employers, 52 Fed. Reg.
24894 (July 1, 1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 516).
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would be altered. While the regulations require that employers
"maintain and preserve records" regarding "[t]otal additions to
or deductions from wages paid each pay period including
employee purchase orders or wage assignments,"169 the
reference to "purchase orders" and "wage assignments" suggests
that the alterations at issue were deductions from workers'
paychecks rather than edits to their hours. The regulations later
refer to these deductions as "items" whose "nature" must be
documented. 170 The reference to "items" dates as far back as the
1941 version of the recordkeeping regulations, which provide
examples of deductions from workers' wages for items such as
"coal," "groceries," "meat," and "rent."17 1 Had the DOL been
referring to hours adjustments, it presumably would have
demanded that the employer document the "reason" for rather
than the "nature" of the deduction.
The regulations' failure to adequately address timesheet
modifications is evidenced further in another provision, which
requires employers to document changes to a timesheet only in
certain limited circumstances. Where employees work a fixed
schedule, and the employer uses that fixed schedule as a
"default" timesheet, the employer must manually affirm "by
check mark, statement or other method that such hours were in
fact work[ed]" or else modify the sheet with the "exact number
of hours worked" if the schedule deviates.172 Yet as
demonstrated in the previous Part, there are numerous other
circumstances in which an employer might edit an employee's
hours, including shifting hours from one workweek to another
and shaving minutes to avoid overtime. Such edits can result in
FLSA violations, and are enabled by features of timekeeping
software, but escape the reach of the FLSA's recordkeeping
regulations as written.
In the absence of adequate regulatory guidance, the DOL
and some courts have taken the position that any modifications
to time cards render them inaccurate, and therefore non-
compliant.173 Yet such an approach is unhelpful, as it
underestimates the inevitability of employer edits to raw
169 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(a) (2016).
170 Id.
171 Records to be Kept by Employers Pursuant to Section 11 (c) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, 6 Fed. Reg. 4695 (Sept. 13, 1941) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. § 516).
172 Solis v. La Familia Corp., 90 FED. R. EVID. Serv. 920, No. 10-CV-2400-EFM-
GLR, 2013 WL 589613, at *7 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2013) ("when employees work a
fixed schedule, the employer must maintain records of any deviation from this
schedule"); 29 C.F.R. § 516.2(c).
173 Solis v. Supporting Hands, LLC, No. CIV 11-0406, 2013 WL 1897822, at * 23
(D.N.M. Apr. 30, 2013) (collecting cases).
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timekeeping data. Raw data does not faithfully reflect actual
hours worked in every case, because humans interact with
automated systems in various purposeful and inadvertent
ways.174 Employee hours are tracked through a myriad of
electronic means, such as an RFID card scan at a workstation or
cell phone or computer log-ons.175 An employee RFID tag that
measures her arrival and departure from the building may
overstate the employee's working time to the extent the
employee is engaged in non-compensable preliminary and post-
work activities,176 or visiting the worksite for non-work reasons.
Employees may forget to punch in or punch out of their
workstation. Thus, a blanket rule that alterations to raw data
are necessarily illegitimate is unrealistic and unworkable;
updated regulations providing for employee notification or
access to supervisor edits would do a better job of protecting
workers without limiting the employer's ability to make
corrections.
174 An employee's RFID tag that measures his/her arrival and departure from the
building may overstate the employee's working time to the extent the mployee
is engaged in non-compensable preliminary and post-work activities. See
Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 513, 518 (2014) (declaring security
screenings noncompensable postliminary activities); Sandifer v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870, 879 (2014) (compensability of donning and doffing clothes
appropriately handled through collective bargaining); Kuebel v. Black &
Decker, 643 F.3d 352, 358-59 (2d Cir. 2011) (non-compensability of commuting
time even when preceded by administrative activities). See also Portal to Portal
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 (West 2016); 29 C.F.R. §§ 790.7-790.8 (West 2016).
Likewise, other timekeeping methodologies can produce raw data that
incorporates a supervisor's modification of employee work time. Just as a
supervisor can direct an employee using paper time sheets not to record
overtime hours worked, so too could a supervisor instruct employees to "log
out" of a work station before the employee finishes working. See supra note
109. Similarly, a system that requires the supervisor's credentials to log the
employee in and out of her shift is vulnerable to the supervisor's manipulation
of working time. See generally Kutzback v. LMS Intellibound, LLC, No. 2:13-
cv-2767, 2014 WL 7187006 at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 16, 2014) (alleging that
managers "systematically and consistently clocked-out [employees] while still
working, resulting in off-the-clock hours worked"); Porcal v. Ciuffo, No. 10-cv-
40016, 2013 WL 3989668 at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2013) (employee alleged off-
the-clock work where supervisors "record[ed] and report[ed] the number of
hours that employees worked on job sites"); Alvarez v. AMB-Trans, Inc., No.
SA-11-CV-179, 2012 WL 5453518 at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2012) (wage and
hour claim alleging off-the-clock work were dispatchers were responsible for
"clocking in" emergency medical technicians).
175 See supra note 2.
176 Integrity Staffing Sols., 135 S. Ct. at 518 (declaring security screenings
noncompensable postliminary activities); Sandifer, 134 S. Ct. at 870
(compensability of donning and doffing clothes appropriately handled through
collective bargaining); Kuebel, 643 F.3d 352 (non-compensability of commuting
time even when preceded by administrative activities). See also Portal to Portal
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 (2012); 29 C.F.R. §§ 790.7-790.8 (2016).
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Beyond the federal FLSA requirements, state wage and hour
laws may impose additional record keeping requirements.1 7 7
These rules tend to specify the type of information to be disclosed
to the employee upon hire,178 the information to be included on
an employee's pay stub,179 and the type of information to be
maintained and preserved.180 These are often formulated
similarly to the federal regulations, requiring that the records
be "true and accurate" and that they include hours worked,
deductions, and net wages. Some state wage theft prevention
laws have sought to impose more stringent record keeping
practices, but do not seem to address the specific challenges and
complexities of maintaining and accessing electronic records.
For example, New York now requires that employers keep
"contemporaneous" records,"181 which appears designed to send
the message that employers cannot simply fabricate records
after the fact.182 Like the FLSA, it does not provide express
guidance on how modifications to employee time records should
be handled, instead merely opining that the ultimate records
should be "true and accurate."
B. An Alternative Regulatory Environment: DOD Audit
Standards
This Part examines an alternative set of regulations: rules
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Defense that govern
timekeeping and wage payment for federal contractors. These
regulations solve many of the problems of the FLSA
recordkeeping regime identified above.
The Department of Defense issues Federal Acquisition
Regulations that apply to contracting entities.183 These
regulations are somewhat similar to the DOL's FLSA
recordkeeping regulations described in the previous Section.
They require contractors to preserve for three years records
showing "daily and weekly number of hours worked, deductions
made, and actual wages paid."18 4 Like the DOL regulations, the
DOD rules require this information to be available for
inspection, on penalty of payment suspension or debarment.185
177 See, e.g., N.Y Lab.. Law § 195 (McKinney 2016).
178 Id.; Cal. Lab. Code § 2810.5 (West 2015).
179 N.Y. Lab. Law § 195; Cal. Lab. Code § 212; Mass. General Law. Ch 149 § 148.
180 Cal. Lab. Code § 1174; Mass Gen. Law Ch 151 § 15; Minn. Stat. § 177.30.
181 New York Lab. Law § 195.
182 Lauren Dasse, Wage Theft in New York: The Wage Theft Prevention Act As a
Counter to An Endemic Problem, 16 CUNY L. REV. 97, 117 (2013).
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Unlike under the DOL regulations, contractors must submit
weekly payroll records to the DOD, along with a signed
statement that the information is "correct and complete" and
that each "laborer or mechanic... has been paid the full weekly
wages earned without rebate." Submission of a false verification
"may subject the Contractor or subcontractor to civil or criminal
prosecution."18 6 While the DOD regulations are more punitive
and require direct submission of records to the DOD, they do not
depart substantially from DOL regulations in the form of
recordkeeping imposed on employers.
The substantive departure from the DOL regulations arises
from the Defense Contract Audit Agency Manual (the "Manual"),
which is intended "to provide technical audit guidance, audit
techniques, audit standards, and technical policies and
procedures" for DOD audit staff.187 The Manual describes its
purpose as "instructive" and advises readers not to reference the
Manual in audit reports or correspondence with other
agencies.188 Although the audience for the Manual is not
necessarily employers and the software makers that cater to
their needs, the Manual is available publicly and influences
employer record keeping practices and software within that
market.
In stark contrast to the FLSA regime, the Manual's primary
focus is on internal controls189 within the timekeeping system:
whether the employer maintains "procedures... adequate to
maintain the integrity of the Timekeeping System."190 It
describes different types of measures for "manual" versus
"automated" timekeeping systems, but either must include
186 Id.
187 DCAA MANUAL, supra note 22, at 0-001.
188 Id.
189 "Internal controls" is an accounting term referring to "a process... designed to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives
relating to operations, reporting, and compliance." Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission, INTERNAL CONTROL -
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK (May 2013),
www.coso.org/documents/internal%20control-integrated%20framework.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B4AS-JHVS]. They typically involve procedures designed to
ensure the integrity of the company's accounting and finances, such as
systems for authorizing and approving expenses, segregating duties,
monitoring activities, or internal and external communications. Id. at 6-7. An
example of "segregating duties" might be assigning different departments to
authorize, record, and handle an asset to reduce the risk of fraud. Vanderbilt
University Office of Internal Audit and Institutional Risk Management, Are
there Different Types of Internal Controls?
https://www4.vanderbilt.edu/internalaudit/internal-control-guide/different-
types.php [https://perma.cc/S9BU-2T88] (Sept 7, 2016).
190 DCAA MANUAL, supra note 22, at 5-909.
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"appropriate controls to ensure corrections to labor records are
accurate and authorized."191 For manual timekeeping systems,
the auditor is instructed to review whether the employer (1)
gives employees possession of their timecard, (2) instructs them
to complete such timecard daily, in ink, as work is performed; (3)
ensures that hours are not recorded in advance, and (4)
supervises employee arrival and departure to "prevent improper
clock-in/clock out."192 The Manual advises that any "corrections"
to a paper timesheet be made in ink, be initialed by the
employee, and include a "sufficient and relevant explanation for
the correction."193 Both supervisor and employee should sign the
record.194 The combined effect of this set of controls is that they
limit employer opportunities to modify the timesheet without
the knowledge of the employee. If the employer wants to make
an after-the-fact correction, it can either disclose that to the
employee, who must initial it, or it can make a correction
without the employee's initials, for the auditor to later discover.
Certainly the employer could try to manipulate employee
timekeeping in other ways19 5-such as instructing employees to
enter inaccurate information onto the timesheet-but at least
that form of non-compliance would be known to the employee.
The Manual advises auditors to look for a parallel set of
procedural standards within automated timekeeping systems.
First, the system should be structured so that "only the
employee uses their labor charging instrument to access the
labor system" and controls should be in place to ensure that
employee credentials are not duplicated or issued to others.
Likewise, procedures should be in place whereby "changes are
initialed, authorized, and dated by the employee and supervisor,
and include a description of the reason for the change. This may
be done electronically."196 Additionally, the automated process
should produce "a verifiable audit trail... that collects all initial
entries and subsequent changes."197 Like the procedures
applicable to manual timekeeping, the rules limit the employer's
opportunity to modify the timecard without the employee's
knowledge.
This portion of the Manual is not lengthy-the above-quoted
provisions occupy about one page. However, its focus on internal
controls is much more effective in encouraging compliance,
protecting employees' substantive wage and hour rights, and
191 Id.
192 Id. at 5-909.1.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See supra note 174.
196 DCAA VIANUAL, supra note 22 at 5-909.2.
197 Id. See also id. at 5-911.6 (Records Retention).
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potentially limiting employers' liability risk than the DOL's
outdated approach. Employers are less likely to make changes
to an employee timecard when they know that it will be reviewed
by the employee, and potentially an auditor. Another critical
component of the DOD system is that the consequences for
procedural lapses-separate and apart from the substantive
violations-are potentially quite severe, and could include
contract termination, fines, debarment, or criminal penalties.19 8
Consequently, contractors have an incentive to take these
procedural duties seriously.
The examples of Category B software discussed in previous
Parts are almost always marketed as "DCAA compliant,"
referring to the Defense Contract Audit Agency Manual. This
software includes none of the "features" that can undermine
wage and hour law that are prevalent in the Category A
examples described above. DCAA compliant software does not
look and feel uniform-the DCAA does not compel employers to
adopt particular practices; rather, DOD audits scrutinize the
employer's procedures. This provides software makers the
freedom to build out the functionality in different ways. For
example, at least one such software provider has a mobile app
that allows employees to use their mobile devices to log in and
out.199
The most significant difference between DCAA-based
software and other types of software is that it is structured to
discourage, rather than facilitate, edits to the raw data. It
functions essentially as a "trusted system" - meaning software
architecture that anticipates and prevents misuse by individual
users.200 A "trusted system" in the digital music context might
prevent users from copying a music file. 201 In the timekeeping
software context, a "trusted system" limits the supervisor's
ability to make edits to a timecard without the knowledge of
198 U.S. v. Maher, 582 F.2d 842 (1978) (criminal conviction under False Claims
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 287, for inflating labor costs in government contracts); DCAA
MANUAL, supra note 22 at 5-907; 18 USC § 1001 (criminal penalties); James
Graham, Mischarging: A Contract Cost Dispute or a Criminal Fraud?, 15
PUB. CONT. L. J. 208, 234 (describing applicable federal fraud and false claims
statutes, and other remedies, including restitution, suspension, debarment).
Typically, allegations of "mischarging" in the government contracting context
involve inflating rather than shaving employee hours. Id. at 209. An
affirmative defense is available where the government was not financially
harmed by the "mischarging." Id. at 230. Nevertheless, anti-fraud protection
intended to protect the government from overbilling produces a positive
externality by protecting employees from wage theft.
199 WEWORKED, https://www.weworked.com/ [https://perma.cc/S3DF-LTWB] (last
visited July 10, 2016).
200 See supra note 15.
201 Zittrain, What the Publisher Can Teach the Patient, supra note 15, at 1215.
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individual employees. While Category A software offers multiple
opportunities for the supervisor to modify raw timesheet data,
Category B software permits only the employee to make edits.202
The DCAA-based software presumes that the raw data is the
most reliable source of information, whereas mainstream
software treats the same information as a rough draft, subject o
further revision and refinement by the employer and its rules.
And as behavioral compliance theory teaches, such a system
likely provides the means and opportunity for cheating.
Certainly, one could argue that DCAA-based software is
inefficient, due to the difficulty of making edits to the raw data.
However, one DCAA-based software maker estimated that fewer
than five percent of employee timesheets are modified by
users.203 Supervisors accustomed to making multiple corrections
to employee timesheets in a Category A setting may also treat
employee timekeeping behavior as fixed-entering missing time
punches for those employees because these corrections are easier
than requiring the employee to correct the error. Yet within a
different software structure that forces employees to account for
and fix mistakes, employees may be obligated to adapt (or face
discipline if not). The more cumbersome edit protocol in DCAA-
based timekeeping software may therefore ultimately save
employer time and effort, as both managers and employees work
harder to ensure the reliability of the underlying raw data.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Our recommendations below seek to balance multiple
competing factors. First, employees deserve to be paid wages to
which they are entitled under the applicable wage and hour
laws. Second, employers have a legitimate interest in efficiently
handling timekeeping and payroll processes. Third, regulations
should not foreclose or limit future software innovations that
may add value for employees and/or employers.
Our recommendations also make several assumptions.
First, we assume that software makers will adapt to new rules
202 The timesheet is then returned to the employee for correction or further
discussion. Of course, the system does not prevent supervisors from unlawfully
instructing employees to remove time worked from their timesheets. However,
such changes at least involve the employee, so the employee is aware of the
lost time and can bring a claim. In that respect, an employee using DCAA-
based software is better positioned than one whose employer is making edits
without the employee's knowledge.
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much faster than rulemakers can respond. 204 This assumption
is realistic and reasonable given the rapidity with which
software has evolved and the regulators' comparative slowness
in implementing changes, in part due to extreme political
gridlock. New rules must be sufficiently robust to remain useful
following such adaptation. Second, we assume that the way
software is actually used is equally as important as its design.205
Put another way, we assume the key design adage that "form
follows function." Third, we place the locus of responsibility for
software choices on the employer, not on the software maker. It
is, for example, possible to imagine a regulatory regime that
regulates software makers directly or that imposes third party
liability on the software maker. This is a fundamental choice in
regulatory design that spans many areas including those well
beyond the scope of this article. However, the existing regulatory
regime makes employers solely responsible for recordkeeping
violations. We assume that will continue to be the case. In other
words, we formulate our recommendations based on real-world
constraints and in line with what would render the
recommendations most likely to be acceptable and
implementable.
A. Improve Data Transparency
As Cynthia Estlund and others have observed, disclosure is
a relatively underused regulatory tool in employment law.206 The
information available to employers about how timecards are
manipulated should be available to affected individual
employees, and should be decipherable to outside experts in the
course of litigation or an audit.207 With that in mind, we
recommend the following transparency related measures.
204 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 6 (2d ed. 2006); Wagner, supra note
104; Wu, supra note 82;
205 In the words of Cass Sunstein, "choice architecture is inevitable. Human
beings cannot wish it away. Any store, real or online, must have a design;
some products are seen first, and others are not. Any menu places options at
various locations . . . A website has a design, which will affect what and
whether people will choose." THE ETHICS OF INFLUENCE, supra note 102, at 35.
206 Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63
STAN. L. REv. 351, 352 (2012).
207 Cass Sunstein draws a distinction between "summary disclosure" and "full
disclosure" as regulatory tools. "Summary disclosure" refers to providing
easily understood information provided in short form that helps people make
decisions (e.g. a nutrition fact label), while full disclosure typically refers to
information provided on the internet for analysis by third parties (e.g. data
about flight delays). SIMPLER, supra note 100, at 77-79. We envision requiring
employers to provide summary form information to employees, while making
full disclosure information available to experts in the course of an audit or
litigation.
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1. Provide Hourly Workers Access to Their Timesheets
including Modifications Made to Timesheets by their
Employers.
The DOL should revise its recordkeeping regulations to
require that employers provide hourly employees with access to
their own electronic timecards. This access should include
disclosure or notification of edits made to those timecards.208
This requirement would serve employees, who would be better
equipped to advocate for their rights with access to such
information. It would also discourage supervisors from making
illegitimate edits because they would face the possibility of an
uncomfortable conversation with an employee or HR. Such a
requirement would also serve well-intentioned employers by
providing a form of early detection for wage and hour violations.
A senior executive would much rather deal with a low level
supervisor who was caught making a few illegitimate edits to a
timecard, than an extremely costly and resource-consuming
wage and hour class or collective action involving multiple
supervisors over a lengthy period of time.
2. Require Employers to Document the Reason for
Edits to Employees' Hours Worked.
The DOL should require employers to document the reason
for each timecard edit, and disclose them to affected employees.
Such documentation could be as simple as choosing from a drop
down menu of choices. The rules also would permit batch edits
with an associated justification - for example, correcting a
mistake made by the login software for multiple employees at
once.
Requiring the employer to document a reason serves
multiple function. First, it imposes a small transaction cost on
the employer for making edits and encourages them to adopt
more accurate time tracking systems that require fewer
corrections. Second, it augments transparency to individuals
affected by the edit about whether or not the edit was legitimate.
Third, it discourages illegitimate edits by the supervisor.
Fourth, it makes the data easier to interpret by an expert after
the fact. Whether that expert is an auditor, a government
inspector, or an outside expert hired by a plaintiff or the
employer, all parties benefit from more transparent data. A
plaintiffs expert can more easily determine whether a claim is
valid, enabling all parties to settle more quickly. The employer's
expert - or the employer itself - might be better positioned to
identify a pattern of problematic edits early on. Likewise, an
208 See Eigen, supra note 148 at 42, 62.
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auditor or investigator can end an audit or investigation more
quickly when better data is available.
3. Employers Should Be Able to Produce a Report of
all Automated "Rules" Applied to Time and Attendance
Data.
The DOL should require employers to be able to produce a
report that describes all of the automated "rules" that are
applied to employee timecards. An auditor - or other outside
expert - should be able to request such a report, and use it to
easily assess whether the rule itself complies with applicable
law, and whether it aligns with the employer's actual practices
around breaks, rounding, or other workplace practices. Existing
software already tracks the use of those rules in order to
implement them. Software functionality summarizing those
rules would not be a drastic technological departure, although
some investment may be required to summarize them in plain
language. Likewise, employees should have access to
information, in simple language, about the automatic rules
applied to their paycheck. For example, employees should be
able to see that a break was automatically deducted from their
time worked on a given date, at a given time.
4. Employers Should Be Able to Produce a Codebook
for Timekeeping Data.
The DOL should require that employers be able to produce a
codebook that defines each of the variables that appear in its
timekeeping software output. For example, suppose certain
entries in the data represent raw data, and edits to the raw data.
The codebook should define the variable distinguishing between
raw and edited data - for example, identifying that the variable
called "Raw" refers to whether the data is raw or edited, and that
the value 0 = raw, and 1 = edited. The codebook should also
define the variables associated with the reason for the edits-for
example, the variable "Reason" might refer to the reason
assigned to the edit, and 1= vacation, 2= machine malfunction,
3 = missed punch, etc. This information is already stored
somewhere within the program. However, not all programs
make this information readily accessible or decipherable to
anyone other than the administrator who originally established
the rules within the system. Most software can be readily
designed to produce a codebook that can be read by common
statistics packages such as Stata, SPSS, or SAS.
5. Employers Should Be Able to Specify Output
Formats for Timekeeping Data.
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The DOL should require that employers use software that
allows the user to specify the form in which timekeeping data
will be exported to the data recipient. An expert - whether it be
an auditor, or outside expert hired by the plaintiff or defendant
- should be able to receive the data in a format compatible with
statistical analysis software. This question is computationally
easy for the software - and is analogous to options visible in
Microsoft Excel for encoding data in "tab delimited" or "comma
delimited" form. In addition, the recipient of the data should be
able to request an output format in base ten with reference to a
specific epoch date. Currently, software makers have no
incentive to produce software that can be readily exported to
software packages other than payroll software. This imposes an
externality on employers, who do not know to demand such
capability of their software providers until it is too late,209 as well
as government regulators and outside experts. This requirement
alone would eliminate substantial transaction costs that
increase the time and duration of litigation.
B. Scrutinize the Employer's Processes for Maintaining
the Integrity of Time Records.
Existing recordkeeping rules, and related case law, already
require that the employer keep "accurate" records.210 However,
the DOL's assessment of accuracy is a binary one - are the
records accurate or not? Employers whose records are deemed
"inaccurate" are heavily penalized in litigation through adverse
evidentiary inferences and the potential imposition of liquidated
(double) damages.211 Employers meeting the "accuracy"
threshold escape further scrutiny of the systems used to record
and modify their employees' time records.
This system offers little in the way of predictability for
employers, nor does it incentivize them to implement better
timekeeping practices. No timekeeping system will produce
completely accurate results, just as no accounting system
produces a completely accurate picture of the financial state of a
company. Every timekeeping system produces some error, and
209 Employers, like the rest of us, may suffer from a problem known as
"comparison friction," which is the idea that choosing among complex
products is difficult. SIMPLER, supra note 100, at 81. An employer's choice
regarding which software to purchase - and indeed, which configuration
package of that software - is exceedingly complex. So much so that Kronos
wrote a 32 page "guide" for selecting timekeeping software. KRONOS, supra
note 66. The abstruse question of whether output from a particular software
package is compatible with statistics software almost certainly fails to rank
among the metrics employers consider in their purchasing decisions.
210 See supra note 7.
211 See supra note 20.
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is vulnerable to some cheating. However, like an audit of a
company's accounting practices, the relevant question should be
whether the employer has adopted systems that minimize errors
and cheating - that send the correct situational cues and
encourage the correct behaviors to achieve the highest possible
level of compliance.
The system of rules and audit guidelines adopted by the
Department of Defense offers a much better approach than do
the DOL's weak, outdated recordkeeping provisions - one that
focuses on the processes adopted by the employer rather than
some unattainable, binary substantive idea of "accuracy." The
DOD does not mandate that an employer keep time in a
particular way. However, it identifies systems that are more
vulnerable to manipulation - such as those that provide
supervisors with unfettered timekeeping modification rights
without notice or input from the employee. When an employer
has adopted a weak system, the DOD subjects that employer's
practices to greater scrutiny in the course of an audit.
We recommend that the DOL take a similar approach in its
Field Operations Handbook. Although other parts of the
Handbook have been revised recently, most of the chapter on
recordkeeping has not been updated since 1988.212 Like the
DOD's Audit Manual, the Handbook should advise auditors to
focus on whether an employer has adopted processes to maintain
the accuracy of the records.213  In addition to the
recommendations in the previous section, such processes might
include whether the employer:
* Provides a mechanism for employees to challenge or
question timecard edits. (For example, an employee
might be provided a button that says "Dispute this
edit" or "Ask a question about his edit.")
* Provides an accessible means for an employee to
override an automatic break or meal period deduction
where no such break or meal period was taken.214
212 Department of Labor, Field Operations Handbook, Chapter 30 ("Records,
Minimum Wage, and Payment of Wages"),
https://www.dol.gov/Whd/FOH/index.htm [https://perma.cc/NB27-S7XU]. The
version currently available on the website includes a table of contents for
Chapter 30 that was updated in 2000. However, the substance of that chapter
dates back to 1988, with the exception of a 2000 update relating to mileage
rates, and deductions in non-overtime weeks.
213 As Orly Lobel and On Amir observe, "In order to apply behavioral economics
insights effectively, there must be a continuous study as to whether the
chosen design attains its intended effect, both at the micro and macro levels."
Lobel & Amir, supra note 115 at 2123.
214 Berger v. The Cleveland Clinic Found., No. 1:05 CV 1508, 2007 WL 2902907 at
*13 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 29, 2007).
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* Adopts procedures through which HR or legal counsel
reviews usage patterns for certain software features
vulnerable to illegal use, and follows up on suspicious
patterns.
The presence of such processes would weigh in favor of an
"accuracy" determination by the DOL, while their absence may
justify further scrutiny of the employer's modifications to
employee time records.
The DOL should also credit employers for implementing
software features that discourage noncompliant behavior and
encourage compliant behavior. Such software features might
include:
* Periodic reminders to supervisors-before reviewing
timecards-that altering an employee's timecard is
dishonest.215
* Displays that show the amount of an employee's
paycheck that is reduced by the timecard edits, to
remind supervisors that they are altering an
employee's take home pay in dollars, not merely in
hours.
* Terminology for software functionality that is
consistent with legitimate rather than illegitimate
uses. For example, software could use the term
"correction" rather than "edit," or the term "report" or
"review" rather than "reconcile."
* Edit interfaces that do not suggest that the raw data
is deleted. Edits could appear in a log, rather than
replacing the original entry in the graphic interface.
Alternatively, edits could appear like "tracked
changes," or the original entry could appear
separately in lighter font. This serves as a visual
reminder to the supervisor that any malfeasance can
later be identified and traced to him or her.
* Warning boxes to supervisors about impermissible
uses of certain software functionality - for example, a
warning to supervisors reviewing an overtime report
215 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 13 (discussing the ways in which warnings
before an action rather than after are more effective in ensuring an ethical
choice with respect to that action); Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The
Dishonesty of Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. OF
MARKETING RESEARCH 633, 636 (2008) (cheating eliminated when participants
recalled Ten Commandments before performing task); Shu, Gino &
Bazerman, supra note 93, at 232 ("One answer to reducing unethicality is
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that it is illegal to decline to pay for overtime hours
already worked.
Conversely, certain practices that erode the integrity of the
employer's records would trigger further inquiry by the DOL.
These might include:
* The implementation of software features whose
illegitimate use predominates over possible
legitimate uses. These include, for example, a "carry
forward hours" feature.
* Choice architecture that offers supervisors an illegal
"option," even if it is one choice among many. One
such example is letting supervisors decide whether
they want to pay "all" "some" or "no" overtime for
hours worked.
* The implementation of software rules that differ
dramatically from the employer's actual practices.
An example would be the use of an auto-break
deduction in a workplace where employees are rarely
afforded the opportunity to take a break.
* Strong pressure from the organization for first line
managers to control payroll costs, and performance
metrics based in part on controlling payroll costs,
where first line managers are responsible for
reviewing, and authorized to make edits to, employee
time cards.216
C. Prohibit Rounding.
Regulations authorizing rounding are a vestige of a pre-
digital age. Rounding rules made sense before the invention of
software that can track and record time in milliseconds. Indeed,
rounding made sense when it was costly for employers to invest
in any tracking system whatsoever. In 1938, the year the FLSA
was passed, many employers likely tracked employee time by
human observation. It is important to note this because the law
needed to harmonize with both economic concerns about the
regulation of work and legitimate concerns about fairness. As
the ability of employers (even small ones) to more accurately
record employees' time has clearly changed since 1938, the laws
have fallen far behind. Category A timekeeping software lives in
the gap between the 1938 statute, the 1987 recordkeeping
regulations, and the 2016 reality of low cost data generation and
compilation.
216 DCAA MANUAL, supra note 22, at 5-907.f. ("supervisors who are accountable
for meeting contract budgets should not have the opportunity to initiate time
charges").
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Regulations should not permit employers that use
automated systems for tracking employees' exact hours,
minutes, seconds, and milliseconds of work to erode the accuracy
of those systems through rounding. Rounding should be
available only to employers that track and enter time
manually.217
VI. CONCLUSION
The problematic software features described in this research
- features allowing supervisors to edit employee hours without
their knowledge and that subtly legitimize those edits, as well
as features implementing employer rules that systematically
disfavor employees - are not beyond the reach of regulators. If
the Department of Labor draws on behavioral compliance
insights and places more stringent requirements on employers,
they will demand - and software makers will produce - better
software. The Department of Labor should consider revising its
Field Operations Handbook to focus on employer procedures for
ensuring the accuracy of timekeeping data. And "accuracy"
should be measured as a procedural, rather than primarily
substantive, matter. Employees should have access to
timecards, and be meaningfully notified of edits and the reason
for those edits. Data maintained by employers should be more
susceptible to expert analysis through codebooks and more
compatible export formats. Rounding should not be permitted in
electronic timekeeping systems based on employee login and
logouts. Taken together, these reforms should allow electronic
timekeeping to live up to its promise as an efficient workforce
management system, saving employers time and money and
ensuring that employees receive a fair day's pay for a fair (and
properly recorded and calculated) day's work.
217 Of course, in theory, such a regulation might incentivize some employers to
adopt manual timekeeping systems. Given the savings and efficiencies that
employers achieve by automating this function, however, we do not expect to
see such a result.
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APPENDIX: SCREENSHOTS OF SOFTWARE FUNCTIONALITY
These screenshots have been modified to magnify relevant
portions of the screenshot. The screenshots also do not represent
the entirety of the screen visible in YouTube. Other portions of
the software functionality may have been visible in the video,
but were not included in the screenshot o save space and focus
on the relevant functionality.
As noted in Section III, supra, the functionality depicted below
may not represent he default settings of the software and may
represent a user-specific configuration or user-generated
content. The screenshots also may not reflect subsequent
software updates.
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Figure 1: Edit Button Included Next to Timesheets218
218 HireLevel powered by Extra Help, Extra Help, Inc. Payroll Services
Timekeeping Demo, YOuTUBE, (Mar. 5, 2014)
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Figure 2: "Edit/View" Option Under "Manage Time
Cards" Functionality 219
219 Patriot Software, Patriot Software's Time and Attendance Software, YouTUBE
(Mar. 2, 2016) https://www.youtube.com/watchv=iqZRBXndXGM (last
visited Sept. 16, 2016).
64
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 19 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol19/iss1/1
THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 19





0 U> ~ C~OAM 5
~ ___
220 The example in the web tutorial involved filling in a missing punch. However,
the cursor based editing system would appear to permit edits to existing
punches (such as the 8:50 AM entry). ADP, ADP's ezLaborManager and RUN
- Processing Payroll, YOuTUBE, (Jan. 5, 2015)
https://www.youtube.com/watchv=z2wi546dq7E (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
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Figure 4: Cursor-Based Edits to Employee Time EntrieS221
221 David Lewis, Timekron Timekeeping Software - Timesheet Time Keeping
Solution, YouTUBE (Mar. 14, 2014)
https://www.youtube.com/watchv=7nCbJ8WMvUY (last visited Sept. 16,
2016).
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Figure 5: Slider Functionality For Editing Employee
Time Entry 2 2 2
222 TSheets, https://www.tsheets.com/ways-to-track-time [https://perma.cc/42E3-
FCZB] (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
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Figure 6: Menu With Various Options For Deleting
Punches223
Delete Out Punch Delete PunchPi
Delete AlI Punches
For Day
Delete All Punches And
Insert Scheduled Punches
223 This figure has been annotated to render small text more legible. Time and
Attendance Pros.com, Time and Attendance Software from InfiniTime Pros,
YOUTUBE, (JUL. 3, 2013). https://www.youtube.com/watchv=gwVwC 11eJJs
(last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
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Figure 7: "Add Comment" Box, In Connection With
Timesheet EditS2 2 4
224 Rich K, supra note 59. Because this video was user generated, the pre-
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225 WorkforcelQ, supra note 119
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Figure 9: Options for Reviewing Overtime 226
226 Rich K, supra note 59 (accompanying narration notes that if an employee
works overtime, the employer is required to pay overtime).
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Figure 10: "Carry Forward Hours" Feature227
72
227 WorkforcelQ's Channel, Carry Forward Hours, YOUTUBE, (MAR. 13, 2012)
https://www.youtube.com/watchv=J5VfillCLk (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
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Figure 11: Different Forms of Employer "Rules" 228
228 WorkforcelQ, supra note 119.
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229 The black box was added to highlight the relevant portion of the screen.
ShiftPlanning, ShiftPlanning Tutorial - Lunch and Break Times, YouTUBE
(Jan 12, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrP18QZYG8 (last visited
Sept. 16, 2016). This video did not originate from McDonald's, the narrator
likely selected "McDonald' s" as a generic company to use as an example for
the software functionality.
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230 The black box was added to highlight the relevant portion of the screen.
WorkforcelQ's channel, Break Rules, YouTUBE (Mar. 13, 2012)
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Figure 14: Employer-Furnished Examples Of Rounding231
231 VANDERBILT UNIV., supra note 138.
Actual Clock In or Out Time Calculation of Paid Time Rounding Zone
(Hour:Minute)
Ex. #1: Clock in 07:57 Rounded to 8:00 Zone 1
Clock out 11:03 Roundedto 11:00 Zone 1
Paid time = 3.0 hours
Ex. #2: Clock in 3:10 Rounded to 3:15 Zone 2
Clockout5:22 Roundedto5:15 Zone 2
Paid time = 2.0 hours
Ex. #3: Clock in 08:25 Rounded to 8:30 Zone 3
Clock out 11:36 Rounded to 11:30 Zone 3
Paid time = 3.0 hours
Ex. #4: Clock in 08:38 Rounded to 8:45 Zone 4
Clock out 11:52 Rounded to 11:45 Zone 4
Paid time = 3.0 hours
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